26-29 September: Affordable Housing Development Summit Middle East, Manama
27-28 September: Unconventional Gas, London
3-5 October: Middle East Investments Summit 2010, Dubai
3-6 October: SWPF - Saudi Water & Power Forum 2010 Conference & Exhibition, Saudi Arabia
3-7 October: Funds Forum Middle East, Bahrain
4-6 October: POWER-GEN Middle East 2010, Doha, Qatar
10-12 October: The 3rd annual Saudi Arabia International Oil & Gas Exhibition & Conference, Dammam
11-12 October: Unconventional Oil 2010, London
12-14 October: Offshore Middle East 2010: The 3rd Annual Offshore Middle East Conference & Exhibition, Doha
18-19 October: Maghreb/Middle East Renewable Energy Conference, Marrakech
24-27 October: MENA Mining Congress 2010, Dubai
26-28 October: Iraq Mega Projects 2010 Conference & Exhibition, Istanbul
27-28 October: Gas to Liquids 2010, London
21-23 November: Private Equity World MENA 2010, Dubai
29 November-1 December: Iraq Petroleum 2010 Conference, London
6-8 December: Smart Grids Middle East, Dubai
Untitled Page
Issue 681, 6 March 2002
Bahrain Opposition Injects Sour Note Into Hamad’s Royal Honeymoon
Opposition groups, infuriated by the final shape of constitutional reforms announced by King Hamad Bin Isa Al-Khalifa—the former Emir who on 14 February promoted himself to full monarchical status—are pondering whether to boycott Bahrain’s 9 May municipal and 24 October parliamentary elections (GSN 680/16).
Angered by the unilateral promulgation of the reforms and the decision to create a bicameral Parliament—with one chamber nominated, the other elected, with equal legislative powers—opposition leaders feel let down. Sources insist they were told that the nominated chamber would be purely consultative.
For now, Hamad is enjoying a honeymoon in the international limelight. The King has been showered with the plaudits of Middle Eastern modernisers such as Iran’s President Mohammad Khatami and Kuwait’s Foreign Minister Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmed Al-Jaber Al-Sabah. Sheikh Sabah announced that he would lead a delegation to Bahrain to deliver his congratulations in person.
The liberal Arab establishment press, typified by The Jordan Times and UAE-based Gulf News, were equally fulsome, praising the new King’s creation of a “democratic constitutional monarchy”. Even Iraq’s President Saddam Hussein joined in.But at home King Hamad’s handling of the reform has met a chillier reception. Opponents say he is at risk of seeing 18 months’ careful progress towards democratic reform lose credibility.
The government has added a crown to the national flag and officially Bahrain has been transformed from a plain “state” into a monarchy. But such gestures alone will not produce national consent to the new structures, critics argue. Opposition leaders fear that the significance of a democratically elected National Assembly will be nullified—by the granting of equal law-making powers to the upper chamber nominated by the monarch and by the King’s own assumption of the power to legislate by decree, should parliament refuse to approve his proposals. They are equally angered by a decision to impose the new rules, rather than seek the endorsement of an elected Parliament first, as the 1973 constitution specifies.
Fear of losing control over the political process appears to have pushed Hamad into taking decisions that could challenge the broad consensus that sustained his reform programme so far.Hitherto, the strength of opposition backing for his action—in particular the approval of influential figures such as Shia cleric Sheikh Abdel-Amir Al-Jamri, had enabled the head of state to overcome the reluctance of his uncle, Prime Minister Sheikh Khalifa Bin Salman Al-Khalifa, and other government and ruling family conservatives.
Opposition groups have yet to decide whether to boycott the elections in protest, or whether to participate while continuing to campaign for change. Already differences are beginning to emerge—and if the opposition fails to agree a common stance, whatever that position may be, it risks ceding influence to conservatives who will continue to press King Hamad to retain the maximum concentration of power at the centre.
Proto-parties
So far, the main emergent opposition “societies”, which are proto-parties—Al-Wefaq (Common Ground), Al-Amal Al-Democrati (Democratic Action) and Al-Minbar Al-Democrati (Democratic Forum)—have issued a common statement criticising Hamad’s approach.Some opposition and religious figureheads opted to stay away from Hamad’s annual Eid Al-Adha reception. But none has yet decided whether or not to boycott the elections.
The mood has not been helped by the Ruler’s sudden reluctance to engage in consultation, after a year when he had held the Palace door open. He must now decide whether to tough it out—but risk losing cross-party support for the reforms—or devise concessions that might reopen dialogue.The stakes for opposition leaders are equally high. Boycotting one of the most far-reaching democratic reforms in the Middle East could mean missing the opportunity of a generation. New confrontation could cost Bahrain much and set back efforts to present itself as a regional model of modern governance attractive to investors, particularly in the important financial sector.
Nominated chamber debate
Hamad’s grant of full legislative powers to a new nominated chamber—preparing the way by scrapping the old Majlis Al-Shura consultative council—may have been the straw that broke the camel’s back of opposition consent. Ever since the reform programme was launched by the then Emir in November 2000, opposition players have pressed their case for the straightforward restoration of the 1973 constitution. Based on the Kuwaiti and French constitutions, this document gave strong powers to the elected National Assembly: the Emir did not have full powers to refuse to ratify its laws, while the constitution itself could only be changed through a two-thirds majority vote.
In private, opposition leaders were well aware that there were aspects of this document that made Hamad uncomfortable, and understood that in some respects he wanted to push reform further than the old document envisaged—for example, through female suffrage (accorded for the upcoming elections) and by giving citizenship to stateless long-term residents.Opposition leaders had reservations about Hamad’s plans to make the head of state a full-status king rather than an emir, and they were wary of plans to retain a nominated second chamber.
The massive popular endorsement of the Emir’s reform plans enshrined in the National Action Charter in the 14 February 2001 referendum created a climate of optimism and flexibility. There was a feeling that during the three-year run up to parliamentary elections promised for 2004 many of these detailed differences could be resolved. Hamad’s decision to unilaterally announce the new framework on 14 February, and to bring forward the election timetable by two years was a typically bold move—which has disillusioned, as well as stunned, opposition groups.
“They want me to abide by a constitution that they have imposed on me, and I think that is not right,” Saeed El-Shehabi, a UK-based Bahrain Freedom Movement leader told GSN. “I have no faith in somebody who uses me to sanction his proposal and then throws me out of the window.”
Despite such anger, opposition figures are wary of committing themselves to a boycott that might diminish their influence. Sources told GSN that Al-Wefaq might postpone a decision on contesting national elections until the local polls were held or even until early summer.Mansoor Al-Jamri, who returned from exile in Britain last year, has begun publicly to argue the case for participation, believing that change may be more effectively achieved from within the system. “We want to enter Parliament, we want to get into municipal councils and we also want to correct some of what happened on 14 February,” Jamri said. He hopes to make the constitutional changes subject to a referendum or, retrospectively, to a parliamentary vote.
Opposition groups claim that Hamad specifically promised that the nominated chamber would only be consultative. They fear that what is presented as equal legislative power in fact amounts to an inbuilt government majority.They point out that the new rules provide that if they cannot agree, the two houses of Parliament (with 40 members each) should stage a joint sitting, with the casting vote held by the nominated chamber’s Chairman. While there are sure to be pro-government members in the elected assembly, the nominated council’s members will all be hand-picked by the King.
Court politics
Behind the developments of recent weeks lie the almost unfathomable question of court politics.
Crown Prince Sheikh Salman Bin Hamad Al-Khalifa is seen as a powerful advocate of reform, but what has been the line taken by Hamad’s other key advisers? Three men are seen as particularly influential: petroleum engineer and former head of the national oil company Dr Hassan Fakhroo, intellectual Arabist Dr Mohammed Jaber Al-Ansari, and Information Minister Nabeel Al-Hamer, who had reservations about Hamad’s decision to license new newspapers (GSN 678/16).
Some opposition pessimists believe the Crown Prince was never as committed to reform as they had hoped. But this has not been GSN’s impression—at least as far as economic modernisation is concerned—and other observers see the constitutional moves as just the latest in the to-and-fro tussle for policy influence between reformists and the conservative old guard within the Al-Khalifa ranks.
