Issue 782, 26 May 2006

Sabah’s big gamble: new Emir faces the new shape of politics

Capable and efficient, but possibly over-reliant on traditional manoeuvres to maintain his hold on the political arena, Kuwait’s new Emir may have failed to read the mood of a country where exasperation at corruption has become widespread and campaigning is being reinvigorated by a more politicised youth.

Leaders of all Kuwait’s main political groups – Islamists, liberals, Shiites and the Popular Block (PB) – are locked in talks over campaign strategy as their newly formed Alliance for Change prepares to challenge government supporters in next month’s surprise early election called by Emir Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmed Al-Jaber Sl-Sabah.

The creation of this cross-party opposition alliance runs parallel with the emergence of a grassroots Orange pro-democracy movement organised by young internet campaigners in a reaction to government procrastination over electoral reform. The very nature of politics is being transformed as this modernising pressure group emerges to drive on established political groups in their bid to force the government to accept change.

Kuwait’s new Emir initially looked decisive as, confronted with bitter wrangles over electoral reform, he suddenly dissolved the National Assembly and called new polls for 29 June. But the move may have backfired, hardening the main political groups’ resolve to unite in forcing government to accept their model for change. Leading figures from the Kuwait Democratic Forum (liberal), Islamic Constitutional Movement (ICM – mainstream Sunni Islamist), both main Salafyist factions, Shiites, PB and Umma (a new Islamic group that has been seeking the right to set up as a political party) have been in negotiations this week to prepare for the new elections.

Far from defusing political confrontation, Sheikh Sabah’s sudden decision to dissolve the National Assembly one year early and call new polls is seen by many opponents as a cynical move designed to secure one more four-year parliament elected under the existing 25 constituency electoral system, which the authorities have admitted fosters corruption and exposes MPs to influence from vested interests (GSN 780/5, 779/1). The dissolution has energised political groups to set aside their deep differences over issues such as education, social policy or economic liberalisation, and to unite in a coalition campaign for electoral reform and the defence of what they regard as fundamental constitutional principles. United in a newly formed Alliance for Change, their first aim will be to retain the 29 seats they already hold, by ensuring that they do not challenge each other. They were, of course, rivals in the 2003 polls. But they also hope that their promising new candidates will manage to capture some of the 19 seats held by government supporters.

Reform confrontation

The events of the past two weeks have transformed national politics and set the stage for an election that will mark a dramatic confrontation between Sheikh Sabah’s government and those who believe Kuwait has to reduce the role of traditional personalised patronage and tribal structures and move towards a greater role for political groups. This is not the first time Kuwait’s quasi-parties have set aside ideological and policy differences to defend their constitutional agenda. Similar coalitions were formed in 1967, 1985 and 1991, to fight off perceived government challenges to the principles of the 1962 democratic constitution. There are two new factors whose impact is hard to predict:

• electorate – its size has been more than doubled, to 334,000, with the granting of political rights to 195,000 women; and

• Orange – the campaign for transparency and reform’s emergence is reviving political interest among younger Kuwaitis, spreading unprecedented information and pressure through the internet.

Such is the influence of patronage and personal connections that it is difficult to forecast how the election result will turn out. For example, in 2003, the popular and respected liberal MP Abdullah Al-Naibari lost his apparently safe seat to an almost unknown businessman who was well regarded by the palace. Predictions are further complicated by the plethora of candidates: it can be difficult for voters to know which candidates in their area are the serious contenders with a real chance of victory, so many votes are wasted on outside challengers with no real chance of winning. But despite such uncertainties, this election seems certain to see a clear clash of political approaches between government supporters – including many tribal MPs and ‘service’ parliamentarians, who represent no clear policy agenda and sustain voter support by arranging government jobs and favours for constituents – and representatives of the main political blocks, fighting in alliance.

Electoral reform the key

At the heart of the contest will be the question of electoral constituency reform. It was confrontation between government and opposition over this issue – culminating in an unprecedented demand from Alliance MPs for Prime Minister Sheikh Nasser Mohammed Al-Ahmed Al-Sabah to submit to formal parliamentary interrogation – that provoked the Emir into dissolving the assembly. For the past three years the main groups have been pressing for the current 25 electoral constituencies – each represented by two MPs – to be replaced with just five or, at the most, ten multi-member areas. They believe this will dramatically reduce the role of patronage, and the capacity for government and elements in the ruling Al-Sabah family to exercise behind-the-scenes influence over parliamentarians.

January’s emiri succession dispute provoked widespread concern that the ruling family’s Al-Salem branch might try to build up its own faction of parliamentary supporters, in rivalry to the dominant Al-Jaber, thus drawing MPs into proxy representation of the internal family rivalries (GSN 775/1). Politicians are anxious to avert this: parliament’s intervention to choose Sheikh Sabah rather than the ailing former crown prince Sheikh Saad Al-Abdullah Al-Salem Al-Sabah was meant as an assertion of parliamentary rights and pragmatic commonsense rather than a factional choice.

Disappointment into action

The prevailing mood of indignation and challenge owes much to the disappointment of hopes raised in the aftermath of Sheikh Sabah’s elevation to emir. His new Premier Sheikh Nasser initially appeared to favour electoral reform; indeed, he insisted that his ministers also back it. A ministerial committee put forward ideas for a two-phase reform that could have been easily implemented. In stage one, neighbouring constituencies would simply have been merged, five by five, to create five large voting areas, in time for the election due in mid-2007. As these would have big imbalances in population, a comprehensive redrawing of districts, to create five voting areas with similar populations, could then have been carried out, in time for the 2011 election.

The political groups could live with this process. Indeed, some of the traditional political class were not too worried that middle class inner Kuwait would have been over-represented for the first four years, in comparison with poorer outlying areas more dominated by tribal interests. But the political groups came to conclude that the government was not serious about change, especially after information minister Anas Al-Rasheed, a liberal academic and columnist, resigned in protest at a surprise new government proposal to boost the number of MPs to 60. This would have led to an increase in ex-officio parliamentary seats for ministers and would have watered down the impact of constituency reform in eroding patronage and personal connections. This was the final straw in persuading the quasi-parties – who are deeply divided over other issues – into moving on from co-operation to the Alliance for Change’s formal establishment. It was catalysed by pressure for action from the burgeoning Orange movement, which has begun to seriously engage younger people and change the nature of grassroots political campaigning, supplementing traditional printed leaflets with internet and text bulletins.

The changed mood, and the impact of these new techniques, is highlighted by events on 23 May, when a senior pro-government candidate, Jamal Al-Ummar, called on an evening diwaniya in Daiya-Shaab: he was turned away by those at the gathering, and within 10 minutes news of this snub was spreading around Kuwait City. The late June vote will test the extent to which political culture in the Gulf’s longest established democratic system has modernised, and to what extent tribal connections and patronage still influence voters. Voters in each constituency are usually presented with an array of choices, with representatives from various political groups, and family and tribal interests; indeed, often these overlap. But this time, if the negotiations between Alliance leaders succeed, in at least 29 cases, voters will be offered a candidate who is the designated Alliance representative, whatever his other affiliations.

If the Alliance strategy is to succeed, it must overcome significant obstacles: not only will its representatives face challengers enjoying the influential support of the government and palace, they will also have to overcome traditional policy reservations in the minds of voters. For example, a leading ICM figure will have to attract the votes of liberal supporters who have hitherto opposed him, and the votes of the new women electors. A liberal will have to win Salaf support. But the Alliance is clearly benefiting from a wave of public anger and resentment at corruption, and a new mood of engagement among younger voters.

Kuwait once again presents a mould-breaking spectacle in the Gulf. Just five months after its elected parliament intervened to remove the incumbent crown prince from the succession line and install the next in line as emir, the country is staging an election in which political groups are setting aside traditional policy and sectarian differences to unite in an open challenge to the government’s agenda.