30-31 January: Middle East and North Africa Energy, London
6-7 February: E & P Information and Data Management, London
6-8 February: PowerGen Middle East, Doha
13-15 February: Kuwait Oil and Gas Summit and Exhibition, Kuwait
14-15 February: 9th Annual Trade and Export Finance Conference, Dubai
27-29 February: Offshore Arabia, Dubai
March (date to be confirmed): Middle East Alternative Investment Summit (location to be confirmed)
3-5 March: Saudi Safety and Security, Saudi Arabia
5-8 March: Middle East Investment Summit, Dubai
5-8 March: Hedge Funds World Middle East, Dubai
6-7 March: Saudi Downstream, Saudi Arabia
5-8 March: Middle East Investment Summit, Dubai
20-21 March : 3rd Annual Middle East Securities Forum, Abu Dhabi
25-27 March: Gulf Environment Forum, Saudi Arabia
25-27 March: Saudi Innovation, Diversification & Investment, Saudi Arabia
24-25 April: Middle East Real Estate Summit, Abu Dhabi
9-10 May: SMI's LNG 2012, London
13-15 May: WEPower, Saudi Arabia
18-20 June: Iraq Petroleum, London
Untitled Page
Issue 802, 30 March 2007
Iraq returnees fuel jihadi terror threat to Saudi Arabia
Insurgency fighters are trickling back to Saudi Arabia and appear to be planning a new home front, choosing targets that will reduce the risk of alienating the public. Some elements of a divided government see conservative preachers as allies in countering this threat.
Unofficial reports from security and Royal Court sources hint at growing Saudi concern at the prospect of a resurgence in extremist jihadi violence, fuelled by the long-feared ‘blowback’ of insurgents returning from Iraq.
GSN has been told that in early March the Mukhabarat security service reported concern about a high risk of attacks in the next two months. And, in the run-up to the late March League of Arab States summit in Riyadh, Royal Court officials are said to have expressed concern about the risk of an attack.
The Riyadh authorities have made great progress in curbing the scale of jihadi activity – and, helped by friends abroad, have succeeded in dampening international speculation about potential blowback – but concern is mounting that militant groups will receive a fresh infusion of expertise and enthusiasm flowing back from Iraq, where jihadists are thought to be developing a new ‘home front’ strategy for the Kingdom. This is built around launching attacks that would be less likely to alienate the Saudi public than the almost random brutality of many past operations.
Last year’s abortive attempt to car bomb the crucial Abqaiq oil processing hub in Al-Hasa is seen as a prototype for assaults calculated to damage government or economic interests while minimising risks to civilians or ‘innocent’ Saudi government employees, such as the police.
The 26 February massacre of French tourists near Medina suggested local jihadis had soft Western targets in their sights, rather than Saudi nationals (GSN 801/4). Some Saudi opposition sources continue to regard the incident as an example of an opportunistic attack by hot-headed young jihadi recruits, rather than a carefully planned operation by Al-Qaeda. But there may have been more to it than that – one suspect, Walid Mutlaq Al-Radidi, was already on a government most-wanted list.
A more strategic approach to undermining Al-Saud rule may be coming. Iraq returnees are believed to be focusing their attention on targeting oil installations or people and locations specifically associated with the House of Saud – planning ‘spectaculars’ that can be viewed as an attack on the power structure and a regime that jihadis regard as having betrayed Islam through its collaboration with the West.
Ultra-radical jihadis, such as Sawt Al-Jihad writer Adeeb Al-Bassam are encouraging attacks on the oil sector, but other radical Islamists debate whether the industry – which pays for the services used by ordinary citizens – can be regarded as a legitimate target (GSN 799/7). There is greater radical consensus on attacking government.
Porous borders
Despite efforts to control movement across the northern land border it is extremely difficult to identify all those returning home from the conflict, some returning via Syria or Jordan, while others slip over the desert frontier. The Shammar tribe, which inhabits large tracts of the Saudi north (and many of whom serve in the border police), also has many members in Iraq and Jordan. Sources report a fair degree of Al-Shammar sympathy for the insurgents.
Some physical security measures are in place; a sand berm has been erected in places, and a track running parallel to the frontier line is reportedly monitored with night vision cameras and equipment sensitive to footprints.
It is impossible to know exactly how many Saudi jihadis are returning home, but informal sources suggest the figure may run to several hundred. The authorities are believed to be arresting all those they can identify, as well as potential new recruits. Non-violent Islamist opposition sources claim the number of these individuals now held in Saudi jails runs into thousands, although there is no way of substantiating such figures.
From Islamists to family, King caught between interest groups
The Saudi government – ironically criticised by hostile elements in the United States and elsewhere for its alleged support for radical Islamist groups (see GSN view) – is continuing to squeeze elements that have supported the rise of jihadist ideologies, including fundamentalist preachers. But King Abdullah Bin Abdelaziz is himself squeezed by a number of competing interests, from radical Islamists to other members of the Al-Saud hierarchy, and there are signs that the pressure is beginning to tell, with the monarch less active at home, while seeking to make his mark in regional politics.
The Saudi authorities no longer permit the ulema to glorify jihad (struggle). General sermon discussion of the religious concept of jihad and the suffering of the faithful is permitted, but any attempt to interpret this in militant terms is outlawed.
Preachers are focusing their critical energy on other issues, such as perceived threats to moral values. This month’s Riyadh book fair, although approved by the Ministry of Information, has provoked widespread conservative anger. Islamist critics claim the exhibition contained books, some written by Saudis, promoting sexual freedom, homosexuality and “pornography”.
Movement for Islamic Reform in Arabia (MIRA) leader Saad Al-Fagih, a prominent London-based opponent, argued that holding such liberal-tinged cultural events suggested the regime again trusted to its alliance with the West, rather than its standing as Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, as its most potent defence.
The Al-Saud leadership seems divided in its response.Interior Minister Prince Nayef Bin Abdelaziz has sought to deploy Islamic thinkers and preachers to counter jihadi radicalism. He allows a wide freedom of manoeuvre to preachers such as Nasser Al-Umer, Salman Al-Awda and Safer Al-Awali, who are allowed to speak out in defence of a distinctly conservative strand of Islamism while steering clear of any support for violence.
There are suggestions that Nayef may have arranged stipends to support some preachers, even though their anti-Western rhetoric is perceived as hostile to the West.
King Abdullah is believed to be sceptical about this tactic, preferring to trust in his drive for transparency and improved governance to bolster the regime’s popular standing.
According to sources, Abdullah favoured the UK Serious Fraud Office continuing its inquiry into the alleged payment of bribes in connection with the Al-Yamamah warplanes deal – which his half brother Crown Prince Sultan and others bitterly opposed (GSN 796/1). Saudi opposition sources told GSN their independent regime sources had also confirmed this was Abdullah’s stance.
The extent to which such tensions are paralysing the government – which the King surprisingly on 22 March reconfirmed in its entirety, having been expected to make significant changes in the four-yearly reshuffle – is unclear. But Abdullah is having problems reconciling regime and opposition critics he had hoped to co-opt into his programme of gradual reform.
Critics include liberals as well as Islamists, with a fundamental change in the system of governance sought by liberals such as Matrouk Al-Faleh and Abdullah Al-Hamed.
Other liberals want change but haven’t campaigned actively for political democratisation; this group includes Turki Al-Hamed, Othman Al-Amer and Al-Arabiya television chief Abdulrahman Al-Rasheed.
Meanwhile Al-Fagih’s political focus was signalled with a call for the public to turn out en masse at two major mosques while the upcoming Riyadh summit is going on. MIRA issued an appeal for crowds to gather on 30 March at the King Khalid Mosque in north Riyadh and Al-Jafali Mosque near Jeddah’s old city.
Such appeals are countered by religious opinion-leaders who are sticking with Al-Saud rule. Indeed, there is a clear distinction between the wide category of both Islamist and liberal advocates of political change, and those liberal or Islamist groups whose concerns are primarily cultural.
Confronted with these different pressures, and the long-running challenge of violent jihadism, King Abdullah has sought to reassure traditional Islamists by focusing on greater transparency and curbs on ruling family extravagance, backed up by active engagement with the public, through visits to the regions and regular public appearances.
Meanwhile, his moves to broaden women’s role and allow greater media freedom are seen as a response to liberal cultural concerns.
But when it comes to the core questions of political structure, such as legislative elections or a substantial reduction in the ruling family’s role in government, the King has been unwilling to shift ground, at least at this stage.
Saudi hunt continues for killers
The Saudi authorities are continuing to hunt those allegedly involved in the 26 February attack on a group of French tourists, along with Walid Mutlaq Al-Radidi, who was named early on in investigations and is already on the government’s list of most-wanted militants (GSN 801/4).
By early March, warrants had been issued for the arrest of two other suspects, Abdullah Sayer Maud Al-Mohammedi and Nasser Latef Al-Balawi, although information is scarce.
A European diplomat on 27 March told GSN: “Al-Mohammedi and Balawi have still not been found. Deadlines were given for the suspects to hand themselves in, but none came forward.” The Riyadh-based source added: “They may be in Yemen or Iraq… maybe they’re still in the Kingdom. Their car [a green Nissan Safari] was found in mid-March, but its location was not revealed.” There have beeAn claims that Al-Mohammedi and Balawi belonged to the Mutawah religious police, but this and other sources denied this.
The government has called them fundamentalist terrorists, and the daily Okaz reported that a reward of SR7m had been issued for information leading to their capture. Okaz interviewed the suspects’ relatives and acquaintances in western Al-Madina; they told the daily that Al-Mohammedi had a record for robbery, and Balawi had faced trouble for not attending prayers. Okaz said the two men were cousins. Their families have been interviewed by government security forces, and a number of other individuals were detained.
