Issue 849, 13 March 2009

An evolving Sadrist movement survives to fight another day

The cadre of politicians that loosely follow Moqtada Al-Sadr’s leadership did surprisingly well in the provincial elections, given they were largely written off as being politically splintered and militarily humbled after 18 months of pummelling by government forces, operated by their rivals and supported by the United States. The Sadrist Independent Free Trend won 41 of the 314 seats contested in Baghdad and nine Shia provinces of southern Iraq. By comparison, the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) secured only 50 seats despite its extensive media campaign and lavish distribution of largesse.

The Sadrists have been down but are clearly not out, showing typical resilience after a long period of setbacks apparent well before Moqtada headed into self-imposed exile in Iran in January 2007. The US-led Surge’s targeting of Jaish Al-Mahdi (JAM) diehards further splintered the movement after Moqtada left; the leader of JAM’s Iranian-backed anti-occupation wing, Qais Khazali, was captured in March 2007 and Sadr was then out-manoeuvred when JAM was blamed for fighting at religious sites in Karbala in August 2007. Following a welter of ISCI-led police arrests of Sadrists throughout 2007, the Iraqi Army moved decisively against JAM in security operations in Basrah, Sadr City, and Amarah in 2008.

The Sadrists’ fortunes have long fluctuated wildly – and there are signs they could be entering one of their positive phases. The movement’s political side – never as powerful as the military wing – has quietly supported the Al-Maliki government’s pruning away of JAM’s criminal and Iranian-backed elements since 2005. Its main problem has been ISCI’s use of the police to target Sadrist politicians.

In the last year, Moqtada has sought to recast his movement in the image of Lebanese Hizbollah. Following the Sadrists’ defeats in Al-Maliki’s 2008 security operations, Moqtada announced the creation of the Mumahidoon (Those Who Pave The Way), as a group focusing on educational and social projects. The only armed element, in theory at least, would be the Promised Day Brigade, a small anti-occupation force with a clear chain of command and strict discipline, which would only target Coalition Forces, and not locals. According to a range of sources in Baghdad, this politicisation of the Sadrists has received a positive response from Maliki; their electoral showing did not seem too threatening, while their strength in the south might actually make them convenient allies before and after the scheduled end-year national elections.

Conclusion: If Maliki’s hunch is correct, the Sadrists may end up as allies, potentially in government, rather than his biggest future security threat. But will the Sadrists’ die-hard Special Groups agree?