30-31 January: Middle East and North Africa Energy, London
6-7 February: E & P Information and Data Management, London
6-8 February: PowerGen Middle East, Doha
13-15 February: Kuwait Oil and Gas Summit and Exhibition, Kuwait
14-15 February: 9th Annual Trade and Export Finance Conference, Dubai
27-29 February: Offshore Arabia, Dubai
March (date to be confirmed): Middle East Alternative Investment Summit (location to be confirmed)
3-5 March: Saudi Safety and Security, Saudi Arabia
5-8 March: Middle East Investment Summit, Dubai
5-8 March: Hedge Funds World Middle East, Dubai
6-7 March: Saudi Downstream, Saudi Arabia
5-8 March: Middle East Investment Summit, Dubai
20-21 March : 3rd Annual Middle East Securities Forum, Abu Dhabi
25-27 March: Gulf Environment Forum, Saudi Arabia
25-27 March: Saudi Innovation, Diversification & Investment, Saudi Arabia
24-25 April: Middle East Real Estate Summit, Abu Dhabi
9-10 May: SMI's LNG 2012, London
13-15 May: WEPower, Saudi Arabia
18-20 June: Iraq Petroleum, London
Untitled Page
Issue 651,18 December 2000
UAE: Sheikh Zayed returns to a testing agenda
Ruler of Abu Dhabi and UAE President Sheikh Zayed Bin Sultan Al-Nahayan has returned home from hospital treatment in the USA. to a crowded and discouraging international agenda. Like other Western allies, his government has felt impelled by the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to distance itself from Washington’s tough stance towards Iraq, and it has also become embroiled in a fresh verbal dust-up with Iran over the disputed islands of Abu Musa, Greater and Lesser Tunbs.
The torrent of oil money continuing to flow into Abu Dhabi’s already well-filled coffers spares Sheikh Zayed the sort of economic worries that greet most returning heads of government after a long stint away. Some project decisions have been delayed and the long-term drive to increase the role of Emiratis in employment has made less headway than he might have liked. But day-to-day administration of the UAE, effectively in the hands of Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Khalifa, has operated without serious hitches during Sheikh Zayed’s months of absence.
In terms of personal popularity, Sheikh Zayed remains as widely revered as ever; he returned to a huge popular welcome and has been quick to make his presence directly felt—for example, visiting a local beach to talk to families relaxing at the start of Ramadan.
Those islands again
But on the foreign relations front, his first new initiative met with a rather more testing reception. Using his 1 December national day speech to appeal for serious, direct negotiations over Abu Musa and the Tunbs islands—or a referral to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the issue—Sheikh Zayed stirred a pugnacious response from Tehran. Describing UAE claims to the islands as “baseless assertions”, Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Hamid Reza Asefi insisted they were an inalienable part of Iran. Although Asefi went on to reiterate Iran’s willingness to engage in unconditional talks on the dispute, Tehran is known to oppose any involvement by a neutral outside organisation, such as the ICJ A mediation effort by the foreign ministers of Oman, Qatar and Bahrain, launched in 1999 by the Gulf Co-operation Council, has yet to make headway.
It may be that, with a presidential election approaching, the administration of President Mohammad Khatami feels it cannot afford to look soft on patriotic issues. The Emirates provide a conveniently unthreatening target for nationalistic grandstanding. Meanwhile, some sources claim that the UAE feels that it should have had more vigorous support on the issue from Saudi Arabia (which has been trying to improve its own relations with Tehran).
This public wrangling has not stopped the active trade flows between the UAE and Iran. With 100,000 Dubai residents of Iranian descent there is strong underlying social and economic pressure on both sides to ensure that the diplomatic dispute does not disrupt the wider relationship.
Palestinian/Iraqi linkage
The violent confrontation between Israel and the Palestinians has injected an edge of difference into relations with the USA and UK Young Gulf citizens joined local expatriate Palestinians in protest demonstrations over the situation and, back on home turf, Sheikh Zayed has been quick to give high priority to the issue.
UAE officials have bluntly pointed out to Washington that the strength of popular feeling about the plight of the Palestinians limits their room for manoeuvre. It was easier for them to support a tough line against Iraq before the “Al-Aqsa intifada” broke out.
Although the UAE continues to provide practical support for Operation Southern Watch air patrols over Iraq, officials privately complain of US “double standards” in taking a harsh line on the enforcement of UN rulings against Saddam Hussein while not applying comparable pressures to Israel. Abu Dhabi makes no secret of its belief that generalised sanctions against Iraq should be abandoned. On this issue it is firmly aligned with Russia and France, rather than the USA and UK.
In his 1 December speech, Sheikh Zayed pressed for international action to end what he described as a “stifling crisis”. He sees Iraq’s present isolation as a recipe for potential instability and is now pressing openly for “reconciliation and reviving Arab solidarity” so that Iraq can be reintegrated into “the Arab circle”. Given the UAE’s decision to reopen its embassy in Baghdad last April, this policy stance is unsurprising; only Saudi Arabia and Kuwait now refuse any direct contacts with Iraq.
However, Sheikh Zayed has not allowed this to colour his judgement on hard financial and military issues. The French, traditionally the dominant military supplier to the UAE.—with an estimated 60 percent market share of defence sales over the past two or three years—has been dismayed to see a $6.4 billion warplane order placed for US-made F16s.
Indeed, this is one major expenditure decision that was not disrupted by the long absence in the USA of the president and some 1,000 family members and retainers. Everyday government was left in the hands of Prince Khalifa, crown prince and vice-commander of the army; Vice Prime Minister Prince Sultan also stayed behind. But most of other key family members have spent much of the past few months in Cleveland, where Sheikh Zayed was being treated at the Mayo Clinic. Those of the Ruler’s 19 official sons who have spent much of the past few months in Cleveland and London include Sheikhs Mohamed (Chief of Staff), Hamdan (Foreign Minister), Azza (head of the state security service), Issa (Under Secretary of State for Public Works), Saif (Under Secretary for the Interior), Nahayan (Deputy Commander of the Royal Guard), Tahnoun (head of Zayed’s private office), Dhiab (director of the presidential court and head of the Abu Dhabi Water & Electricity Authority—a key job in the midst of utilities privatisation), Abdullah (Information and Culture Minister), Said (head of the ports administration), Mansour (head of the office of the head of state), Omar (Zayed’s aide-de-camp) and Falah, who has no official post.
The absence of so many key players has inevitably slowed the wheels of planning and decision-making; but government has certainly not ground to a halt. Moreover, neither the persistence of this family-dominated government structure, nor the princes’ prolonged absence in the USA, appears to have aroused resentment among Emiratis. There is little sign of any grassroots pressure for Abu Dhabi, or even the UAE as a whole, to emulate the democratisation moves now under way in Bahrain, Qatar and Oman.
While the short-term political outlook and the financial situation appear comfortable, Sheikh Zayed’s return may mark the focus of fresh attention on long-term development issues such as “emiratisation” in employment and major infrastructure projects. Prequalification offers have now been invited for a 100 million gallons per day desalination plant at Fujairah, a 100 megawatt -200 megawatt power plant and a 180-kilometre aqueduct between Al Ain and Qidfa; the combined value of this project portfolio could top Dh1 billion.
