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Three years into an ambitious plan to transform the Ministry of Defence (MoD)’s operational effectiveness, the programme is running into trouble as the initial enthusiasm dissipates. The transformation programme is an important element in the Vision 2030 strategy, as Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman (MBS – also defence minister ) regards the MoD as being in the vanguard of his plans.

Head of state security General Abdelaziz Bin Mohammed Al-Howairini faces another challenging year at the helm of the Presidency of Public Security (PPS). Having been rehabilitated by Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman (MBS), Al-Howairini has the heavy task of protecting domestic security. This was challenging even before the assassination of Iranian military kingpin Qassem Soleimani, which drive reprisals on Saudi soil.

The success of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), Shia militia and other allies in regaining control of Tikrit will provide critical indicators of Iraq’s ability to roll back the challenge of Islamic State (IS) and the Sunni rebellion that in 2014 allowed Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi to anoint himself ‘Caliph Ibrahim’ in Mosul. Western reporting of the assault on Salahaddin province, launched on 1 March, focused on prime minister Haider Al-Abadi’s insistence that a restructured ISF, its Shia militia allies and their all too obvious Iranian handlers should do everything possible not to alienate the region’s Sunni tribes and others who may dislike IS but have even more reason to fear their ‘liberators’.

Washington’s new National Security Strategy (NSS) opens with a preamble, signed by Barack Obama – a president burnishing his legacy ahead of the November 2016 election in the face of security crises his administration is hard-pressed to counter. “Today, the United States is stronger and better positioned to seize the opportunities of a still new century and safeguard our interests against the risks of an insecure world,” the preamble says, citing “America’s growing economic strength [as] the foundation of our national security and a critical source of our influence abroad”.

No one expected a quiet year in the Gulf, given the ongoing conflicts and ugly groundswell of sectarianism throughout the wider region. But while much of the news agenda in 2014 was filled with foreseeable preoccupations – squabbles between Qatar and the rest of the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC), the further deterioration of the situation in Yemen, tentative rapprochement with Iran, ongoing tensions in Bahrain, questions over succession – the main event of the year came as a surprise. The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)’s takeover of Mosul in June, and the group’s subsequent seizing of swathes of Iraq, cut the year into two halves: before ISIL, and after.

Sweden’s defence minister quit last week after outcry at government plans to help Saudi Arabia build a weapons plant. Swedish outrage at the idea of signing military agreements with undemocratic countries is admirable; British and US newspapers have also recently decried massive arms deals to the Gulf. But arguably, the provenance of weapons – while important to the domestic politics of source countries – is only a sideshow.

The blame game began within hours of Sunni extremists taking Mosul (see page 1). Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki blamed members of the army for deserting, saying the seizure of the city was a “conspiracy”. Saudi Arabia blamed Iranian-backed Maliki, with information minister Abdelaziz Bin Mohieddin Khoja saying: “This would not have arisen were it not for the sectarian and exclusionary policies practised in Iraq over the past years”. Former British prime minister Tony Blair blamed the civil war in Syria (and definitely not the 2003 invasion of Iraq of which he was a primary architect). Writing in The Wall Street Journal on 15 June, L Paul Bremer, the former US governor of Iraq, tried to pin it on US President Barack Obama, who, he said, pulled US forces out of Iraq too soon.

One of the more bizarre arguments put forward by the Obama administration as it pushed for military intervention in Syria was that failing to respond to the horrific chemical attack on Ghouta would send the wrong ‘message’ to Iran. On 3 September, secretary of state John Kerry mentioned Iran four times in his brief opening statement to members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, as he sought to convince them of the need to strike. “Iran is hoping you look the other way,” Kerry said. “Our inaction would surely give them a permission slip for them to at least misinterpret our intention if not to put it to the test.” Defence secretary Chuck Hagel took a similar tone. “Our refusal to act would undermine the credibility of America’s other security commitments, including the president’s commitment to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon,” he said.

The British-Omani military exercises Al-Shomoukh 2 and Saif Al Sarea 3 were still in full swing on land, sea and air as GSN went to press – a clear demonstration of international support for a sultanate that has long been seen as a maverick within the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC). The exercise is a sign for Muscat that it still has friends in high places – which is particularly important these days given the concerns that are bubbling up among the sultanate’s strategists, as well as analysts in Washington and elsewhere, about the intentions of its neighbour, the United Arab Emirates.

With Islamic State (IS or Daesh) continuing to lose ground in Mosul, the time will soon come when Iraqis can look beyond the destruction wrought by that invidious group and dare to focus instead on the future. They can do so buoyed by some promising signs that things could at last start to move in the right direction. A recent survey of 1,338 Iraqis found they were more optimistic about the country’s direction, not least because of improvements in security and reductions in sectarianism.

In contrast to the UAE’s public withdrawal from Yemen – where Emirati military forces formally pulled out last October, although it has retained a less widely publicised presence, notably on the islands of Socotra and Mayyun – Oman has steadily increased its influence in the worn-torn state.

Criticism surrounding the $53m US deal to sell armoured vehicles and military equipment to Bahrain has grabbed the headlines, but it is a drop in the ocean in terms of US arms exports.  

There was a lull in the speculation over the potential bombing of Iran by the United States or - more likely - its ally Israel, with the world transfixed by Barak Obama's victory in the US presidential election. Talk of significant offensive action against Tehran became intense during the late summer, with two theories circulating on the eventuality of a strike to knock out Iran's nuclear facilities and perhaps other targets. One theory was that the outgoing Bush administration would sanction a strike as its last neo-conservative hurrah; and, two, that Israel would be emboldened to act. In September, UK daily The Guardian, added to the debate by publishing details of documents showing how Washington had sought to rein in Israeli hawks who were ready to attack.

Violence is once again tearing Iraq apart. The fall of Mosul did not just mark the terrifying rise of jihadists from the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL – now calling itself the Islamic State), but also the beginning of a wider Sunni insurgency which has been long in the making: GSN has been writing about Baathists and Salafis pooling resources to fight the government in Baghdad since 2009, in a series of sadly prescient analyses which even anticipated co-operation with Sunni insurgents in Syria.

The result of the United States’ presidential election has put in doubt the future of the July 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), under which Iran suspended its uranium enrichment programme in return for a relaxation of sanctions. If President-elect Donald Trump’s administration follows through on his campaign pledge to rip up the deal and retighten the sanctions regime, the US will likely encounter resistance from its Russian, Chinese and European co-signatories, all of whom are being courted ever more assiduously by Tehran.