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Three years into an ambitious plan to transform the Ministry of Defence (MoD)’s operational effectiveness, the programme is running into trouble as the initial enthusiasm dissipates. The transformation programme is an important element in the Vision 2030 strategy, as Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman (MBS – also defence minister ) regards the MoD as being in the vanguard of his plans.

Head of state security General Abdelaziz Bin Mohammed Al-Howairini faces another challenging year at the helm of the Presidency of Public Security (PPS). Having been rehabilitated by Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman (MBS), Al-Howairini has the heavy task of protecting domestic security. This was challenging even before the assassination of Iranian military kingpin Qassem Soleimani, which drive reprisals on Saudi soil.

The success of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), Shia militia and other allies in regaining control of Tikrit will provide critical indicators of Iraq’s ability to roll back the challenge of Islamic State (IS) and the Sunni rebellion that in 2014 allowed Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi to anoint himself ‘Caliph Ibrahim’ in Mosul. Western reporting of the assault on Salahaddin province, launched on 1 March, focused on prime minister Haider Al-Abadi’s insistence that a restructured ISF, its Shia militia allies and their all too obvious Iranian handlers should do everything possible not to alienate the region’s Sunni tribes and others who may dislike IS but have even more reason to fear their ‘liberators’.

Washington’s new National Security Strategy (NSS) opens with a preamble, signed by Barack Obama – a president burnishing his legacy ahead of the November 2016 election in the face of security crises his administration is hard-pressed to counter. “Today, the United States is stronger and better positioned to seize the opportunities of a still new century and safeguard our interests against the risks of an insecure world,” the preamble says, citing “America’s growing economic strength [as] the foundation of our national security and a critical source of our influence abroad”.

No one expected a quiet year in the Gulf, given the ongoing conflicts and ugly groundswell of sectarianism throughout the wider region. But while much of the news agenda in 2014 was filled with foreseeable preoccupations – squabbles between Qatar and the rest of the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC), the further deterioration of the situation in Yemen, tentative rapprochement with Iran, ongoing tensions in Bahrain, questions over succession – the main event of the year came as a surprise. The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)’s takeover of Mosul in June, and the group’s subsequent seizing of swathes of Iraq, cut the year into two halves: before ISIL, and after.

Sweden’s defence minister quit last week after outcry at government plans to help Saudi Arabia build a weapons plant. Swedish outrage at the idea of signing military agreements with undemocratic countries is admirable; British and US newspapers have also recently decried massive arms deals to the Gulf. But arguably, the provenance of weapons – while important to the domestic politics of source countries – is only a sideshow.

The blame game began within hours of Sunni extremists taking Mosul (see page 1). Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki blamed members of the army for deserting, saying the seizure of the city was a “conspiracy”. Saudi Arabia blamed Iranian-backed Maliki, with information minister Abdelaziz Bin Mohieddin Khoja saying: “This would not have arisen were it not for the sectarian and exclusionary policies practised in Iraq over the past years”. Former British prime minister Tony Blair blamed the civil war in Syria (and definitely not the 2003 invasion of Iraq of which he was a primary architect). Writing in The Wall Street Journal on 15 June, L Paul Bremer, the former US governor of Iraq, tried to pin it on US President Barack Obama, who, he said, pulled US forces out of Iraq too soon.

One of the more bizarre arguments put forward by the Obama administration as it pushed for military intervention in Syria was that failing to respond to the horrific chemical attack on Ghouta would send the wrong ‘message’ to Iran. On 3 September, secretary of state John Kerry mentioned Iran four times in his brief opening statement to members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, as he sought to convince them of the need to strike. “Iran is hoping you look the other way,” Kerry said. “Our inaction would surely give them a permission slip for them to at least misinterpret our intention if not to put it to the test.” Defence secretary Chuck Hagel took a similar tone. “Our refusal to act would undermine the credibility of America’s other security commitments, including the president’s commitment to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon,” he said.

The British-Omani military exercises Al-Shomoukh 2 and Saif Al Sarea 3 were still in full swing on land, sea and air as GSN went to press – a clear demonstration of international support for a sultanate that has long been seen as a maverick within the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC). The exercise is a sign for Muscat that it still has friends in high places – which is particularly important these days given the concerns that are bubbling up among the sultanate’s strategists, as well as analysts in Washington and elsewhere, about the intentions of its neighbour, the United Arab Emirates.

With Islamic State (IS or Daesh) continuing to lose ground in Mosul, the time will soon come when Iraqis can look beyond the destruction wrought by that invidious group and dare to focus instead on the future. They can do so buoyed by some promising signs that things could at last start to move in the right direction. A recent survey of 1,338 Iraqis found they were more optimistic about the country’s direction, not least because of improvements in security and reductions in sectarianism.

In contrast to the UAE’s public withdrawal from Yemen – where Emirati military forces formally pulled out last October, although it has retained a less widely publicised presence, notably on the islands of Socotra and Mayyun – Oman has steadily increased its influence in the worn-torn state.

It was on the occasion of Queen Victoria’s Diamond Jubilee in 1897 that Rudyard Kipling penned his ‘Recessional’, a hymnic warning about the inevitable decline of the British Empire. “Lo, all our pomp of yesterday/ Is one with Nineveh and Tyre!/Judge of the Nations, spare us yet,/Lest we forget – lest we forget!” wrote the poet of the Empire, as Britain’s redoubtable monarch marked 60 years on the throne.

Whether President Barack Obama should have carried through on his threat to intervene in Syria when evidence of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) were revealed in 2013, or if Western allies should have been more robust in projecting their interests in building a post-Qadhafi state in Libya, remain live issues today. The fact that neither happened can be traced directly to the catalogue of disasters that began with the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003; an ignominious chapter of recent western history which has now been elegantly and intensively recorded in Sir John Chilcot’s Report of the Iraq Inquiry, which covers the UK’s involvement from mid-2001 until its troops formally withdrew in July 2009.

The images and tales that emerged from Al-Shabaab’s attack on Kenya’s Westgate mall were searingly dreadful. Mothers shielding toddlers, blood pooling on tiles, the sheer terror of gunfire in what was supposed to be a benign location. Rarely has the vocabulary of winning been so unconsonant. “We have defeated our enemies,” Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta declared as the four-day siege came to an end on 24 September, leaving at least 70 people dead. For all the bravery of security forces, for all the unity of horrified Kenyans, it is wrong to suggest that anyone wins.

GSN’s year-end Perspective/Agenda feature provides a look back – and forwards – at key events across the region in 2020-21. It gives an opportunity to update the Risk Grades included with each of our regular Risk management reports. After another year of tragedy, Yemen is effectively a failed state (rated F6, the bottom political and financial grades). Qatar has shown itself to be robust in the face of its neighbours’ boycott, its finances warranting an upgrade to 1, putting it on a par with the UAE. Iraq’s political standoffs and financial woes remain deeply troubling, but the situation is improving rather than deteriorating and the prospect of higher oil prices next year should help further; it has been upgraded from E5↑ to D4↓. Oman’s fiscal challenges continue to mount, prompting a downgrade of its economic rating to 3.