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The region’s more enlightened leaders and corporate players knew radical change was coming to the global energy industry long before the UN Conference on Climate Change (COP21)’s Paris Agreement to cut global greenhouse gas emissions was approved by 197 governments in December. Even the world’s leading oil producers have plans to install large amounts of renewable energy (RE) generation. Solar photovoltaic (PV) and other clean energy projects are being promoted across the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) region, while climate change denial is out of fashion.

ExxonMobil’s audacious six-block deal with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has plunged a dagger into the already uneasy peace between Arabs and Kurds, giving an immediate public relations boost to the headline-chasing KRG natural resources minister Ashti Hawrami and pouring further misery onto Baghdad’s embattled deputy prime minister for energy affairs Hussein Al-Shahristani.

An election victory next May seems to be Presidential Hassan Rouhani’s to lose, but the big winners on the Iranian business scene continue to be the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC or Pasdaran) and other conservative factions – a harsh reality for oil majors considering investments and others hoping for a soft landing in Iran after the nuclear deal. Their powerful position signals that hardliners are in no way in retreat, even if many Iranians would like to see genuine change.

It may finally be crunch time in Iraq for ExxonMobil, which in late 2011 led the charge north when it became the first major to sign a contract for exploration blocks in Iraqi Kurdistan. After months of back and forth, and meetings between chairman Rex Tillerson and (separately) Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki and Kurdish Prime Minister Massoud Barzani on 21 and 22 January, Exxon has apparently been told to decide once and for all between its 60% stake in the $50bn West Qurna 1 project in the south and its production-sharing agreements in blocks still being explored in Iraqi Kurdistan (Al Qush, Arbat East, Baeshiqa, Betwata, Pirmam and Qara Hanjeer).

Tehran’s insistence that it can continue selling its crude oil to customers across the globe is being tested – not least by signs that its once-staunch ally China may be wobbling under pressure from the United States. Conventional wisdom had it that Beijing’s strategic interests in Iran would compel it to challenge the US sanctions regime. However, Sino-Iranian trade seems to have dropped sharply since Washington imposed further sanctions on Iran in early November.

The discovery of a reserve of more than 80bn barrels of shale oil in shallow waters off the west coast of Bahrain, first revealed on 1 April along with some significant new gas finds, could hardly have come at a better time for the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) region’s weakest economy. A few days earlier, the government had pulled a planned multi-tranche sovereign bond issue after being spooked by the high returns demanded by investors.

It has been an eventful year in the Gulf. Against a backdrop of wider regional turmoil – the civil war in Syria and the overthrow of Egypt’s Mohammed Morsi (GSN 951/1) – the six Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) states have been broadly stable, their political currents stirred but not redirected by events elsewhere. In Saudi Arabia, King Abdullah Bin Abdelaziz seemed keen to get his house in order, promoting several younger members of the Al-Saud, and delivering on a promise made in 2011 to appoint women to the Majlis Al-Shura (GSN 948/5, 946/6, 942/1, 941/1, 940/1, 939/20).

The oil price remains volatile, but ministries of finance may take comfort in the views of their hydrocarbons sector counterparts – and a majority of international analysts – that crude won’t collapse once more this year. This reflects on the success of the Opec+ group – comprising the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, Russia and nine other non-Opec producers – in raising prices in the past year. Opec’s co-ordination with non-Opec partners under the so-called Declaration of Co-operation encouraged crude prices to peak at around $85 a barrel (/bbl) in October.

Leave aside for a moment the football politics, so often an opaque affair, and the disappointment of much larger and more established soccer-playing nations, whose hopes of hosting a World Cup were dashed by the Zurich-based Fédération Internationale de Football Association (Fifa), the sport’s governing body. What does the success of Qatar’s bid to host the 2022 Fifa World Cup say about the nature of polities and geopolitics as the world remakes itself after a decade defined by the West’s unresolved interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, and staggers to an end with European economies and the United States struggling to recover from the credit crunch?

Differences between Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman (MBS) and his Emirati counterpart, Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Sheikh Mohammed Bin Zayed Al-Nahyan (MBZ) have been mounting ever since Riyadh led the way towards reconciliation with Qatar at the Al-Ula summit in January.

Commerce spoke louder than diplomacy when the state-owned QatarEnergy announced a ten-year deal to supply condensate to the Dubai government-owned Emirates National Oil Company (Enoc). It represents the first major commercial deal since the two Gulf Co-operation Council partners (or mainly, in recent years, rivals) agreed in June to reopen their respective embassies.

On 14 November in Beijing, state-owned Saudi Arabian Oil Company (Saudi Aramco) announced the official opening of Aramco Asia, a wholly owned affiliate of Saudi Aramco headquartered in the Chinese capital, and intended to serve as the “business and cultural exchange portal between Saudi Aramco and China”.

The breakdown of the deal between The Dow Chemical Company and Petrochemical Industries Company – in which the Kuwaiti state-owned PIC would take a 50% stake in the United States’ largest chemicals group for around $9bn in return for the Americans developing the emirate’s downstream value-added via the KDow joint venture – is unsurprising.

Lured by a combination of extraordinary prospectivity and attractive fiscal terms, international oil companies (IOCs) are more and more prepared to discount the political risks of signing production-sharing contracts (PSCs) with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), even though those risks are increasing exponentially with the growing acrimony between Erbil and Baghdad.

The impact of the Covid-19 pandemic continues to override all other issues in Kuwait. While the initial response to the pandemic was exemplary, the implementation of a full curfew on 10 May is causing some to question whether the country can really deal with the coronavirus effectively. The number of new officially confirmed cases has been averaging 900-1,000 a day recently. The total reached 17,568 by 20 May, with 124 deaths.