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The politics were long in the making before the crisis erupted between Qatar and three major Gulf Cooperation Council partners turned adversaries – Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and the UAE (the ‘GCC-3’) – plus Egypt and other allies from the wider Muslim world, but several of the immediate consequences emerging from the conflict are nevertheless unexpected.

Excellence in sport and political ambition, even recognition by the Davos forum as next generation global leaders, mark out the elite of twentysomething Gulf royals at least those in the ruling ...

The detention of Emiratis critical of government policies shows the government is in no mood for a ‘people’s coup’. But the arrests have also shone a light on the country’s vibrant and diverse reform movement

The lasting legacy of the Bahrain Grand Prix is likely to be further radicalisation on all sides of the conflict. As the flare of media attention dies down, analysts expect to see Crown Prince Salman continue to be sidelined as the Al-Khalifa weigh the damage to the country’s image

Ratings downgrades for major Saudi investors, a potential systemic crisis in Kuwait where investment companies are in freefall, fraud charges against well-connected Dubai developers and a marked lack of performance by Abu Dhabi’s investment flagship. A cross-section of business stories in this issue of GSN paints a sobering picture of the potential pitfalls that can befall investors in the GCC, even if the region hasn’t been as dramatically affected by the global credit crunch as other parts of the world.

Security comes at a high cost in Bahrain, but exactly how high is difficult to ascertain. “Significant areas of government activity, including the security services and the Bahrain Defense Force, lacked transparency”, the US Department of State’s new Report on Human Rights Practices in 2015 observed in its section on Bahrain. Unsurprisingly, the 2015/16 budget approved last July (like budgets before it) provides only the broadest of outlines on government spending. As the State Department comments: “The government generally did not provide citizens access to government-held information.

The UAE has developed into a glitzy global business and leisure hub without apparently attracting the ire of ultra-radical jihadists, whose bombing campaigns have so challenged the Emirates key a...

It is not yet another ‘Tanker War’, but the latest sabotage of oil tankers has highlighted again the region’s vulnerability to attacks on its key export. Oil prices have remained relatively steady – influenced by a global bear market and substantial stocks in major consumers – but the attacks on six ships in May and June still carry the risk that geopolitical tensions between Iran and the United States could spill over into a full-blown conflict, whether by accident or design.

Saudi Arabia’s new king did not wait long to restructure institutions and bring fresh faces into government, in changes which have given yet more influence to his son Mohammed and strengthened the position of Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Nayef. King Salman also promised money to his subjects, in a display of traditional Al-Saud largesse. This 10-page special report, originally published within GSN Issue 986, analyses the winners and losers in King Salman's new government, the new balance of power within the Al-Saud and the likely impact on domestic, energy and foreign policies – including GCC relations, and policies towards US, Syria, Iran and Yemen.

Donald Trump’s decision to turn his harsh rhetoric into a confrontational policy on Iran’s Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) nuclear deal was widely expected – in the process undermining another legacy of his predecessor Barack Obama. The US president has gone as far as he could to call the JCPOA into question, but this is still not as far as candidate Trump promised during last year’s election campaign to trash “the worst ever deal”. The US ball is in Congress’s court, leaving the world wondering what his next step might be. Only Iran’s most concerted enemies – who include the staunchest of US allies in the Middle East: the ‘GCC-3’ of Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi and Bahrain, and Israeli prime minister Benyamin Netanyahu – believe they have won out in Trump’s most antagonistic line.

With the regime of Syria’s President Bashar Al-Assad looking ever more secure, attention in regional capitals is turning to what might happen next. While the monarchies were early movers in finding proxies in Syria, Iran’s tactics during the eight years of civil war have proved far more successful than those of its Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) rivals. It is Tehran’s ally Assad who remains at the helm while opposition groups backed by Saudi Arabia and others have largely failed.

Huge protests have brought Kuwait to a critical juncture, as the government tightens control and opposition leaders threaten to boycott elections now scheduled for December. But a conclusive outcome remains far from certain with deference to the Al-Sabah, disunity on both sides and the threat of outside interference all at play

No reason has been given for the dismissal of Saudi deputy defence minister Prince Khalid Bin Sultan. In a 20 April royal order, King Abdullah installed Prince Fahd Bin Abdullah in the post, the latest in a string of appointments apparently aimed at getting his house in order.

An increasingly assertive Abu Dhabi is looking to draw in international partners and assets, to consolidate its traditional position as the UAE’s federal capital and engineering hub, and to emerge as the Gulf city that uses its wealth to plan development with respect for social traditions and environmental constraints while emerging as a significant new international player. GSN examines the oil-rich emirate’s growth strategy and attitudes towards spending money – at home and on less wealthy emirates.

Dubai’s Al-Maktoum have created the Gulf ’s most vibrant business hub and a global profile via their investments, focus on commerce and trade, love of horse-racing and position of Dubai as a major tourist hub. Dubai is the second key emirate in the UAE (alongside Abu Dhabi), and the ruling families of both come from the same Bani Yas tribe: Al-Maktoum from the Al Bu Falasah/Al-Falasi section and Al-Nahyan from the Al Bu Falah. The two branches split when, led by Sheikh Maktoum I Bin Bati Bin Suhayl, the Al-Maktoum left Abu Dhabi for Dubai in the 1830s; the family’s rule started shortly after.