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The threat of a major confrontation in the region remains real. While both sides publicly say they do not want a conflict, some senior figures in the United States, such as long-time Iranophobe national security advisor John Bolton, are acting as if they do, while hardliners in the Islamic Republican Guards Corp (IRGC) and other revolutionary and ‘principalist’ bastions in Iran would not shy away from confrontation either. In such an environment the biggest threat may be that misunderstandings lead to war by accident rather than by design.

Some 30 Al-Saud princes – and one princess – have been appointed to positions of authority by King Salman Bin Abdelaziz since 2017. The appointments have come in waves: 22 in 2017 (GSN 1,041/6), seven in 2018 (GSN 1,072/1, 1,061/6, 1,055/1) and four in spring 2019 (GSN 1,075/1). Many are notably young, in a system that has traditionally not favoured youth, and are drawn from the same cohort as Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman (MBS).

Clashes are escalating in Taiz, as rival pro-government factions vie to expand their control throughout the central Yemeni city and surrounding rural areas. Meanwhile, Houthi forces in the north and east of the city continue their four year-long siege. The violence further highlights the lack of progress, five months on, of the Stockholm peace plan, which called for the opening of Taiz to merchants and international aid organisations. Progress is similarly slow in Hodeidah’s negotiations. There are concerns that President Abdo Rabbo Mansour Hadi’s latest political manoeuvring may exacerbate the conflict in Taiz, rather than deliver a solution.

Tensions between the United States and Europe over attitudes to Iran are seeping across into other areas of policy. Clear differences are emerging between Washington and some European capitals over President Donald Trump’s policy towards Iraq and its Shia-dominated government’s alliance with Tehran. The focus of US policy in the Gulf region is on trying to isolate Iran and, to promote this, Washington is intent on driving a wedge between Baghdad and Tehran. However, European diplomatic sources are concerned that the ‘with us or against us’ choice being presented to Baghdad is likely to prove counter-productive and will simply push Iraq further into the arms of Iran.

With the regime of Syria’s President Bashar Al-Assad looking ever more secure, attention in regional capitals is turning to what might happen next. While the monarchies were early movers in finding proxies in Syria, Iran’s tactics during the eight years of civil war have proved far more successful than those of its Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) rivals. It is Tehran’s ally Assad who remains at the helm while opposition groups backed by Saudi Arabia and others have largely failed.

Another round of fevered speculation about splits in the most senior ranks of the Al-Saud was set off on 5 March, with a report that King Salman Bin Abdelaziz Al-Saud has clashed with his son Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman (MBS) over the Yemen war, the fallout from the Jamal Khashoggi affair and other matters. In the most dramatic allegation, the king’s advisors were said to have changed the personal security team that accompanied the monarch during his recent trip to Egypt, due to suspicions about where their true loyalties lay.

Aseries of events in mid-February, including the anniversary of the revolution which brought the Islamic Republic into being, have served to highlight many of the problems facing Iran but also to underscore the divisions among its opponents. Rahbar (Supreme Leader) Ayatollah Ali Khamenei issued a long statement on 13 February, the day of the anniversary, in which he said Iran “is always flexible and ready to correct its mistakes”. The Islamic Republic was now “entering the second phase of self-development”.

Saudi officials are trying to put the murder of dissident journalist Jamal Khashoggi behind them, with a new initiative to kick-start inward investment and a range of soft power initiatives. But while the stellar turn-out of sporting stars, entertainers and business leaders arriving in the kingdom suggests that – rather predictably – many supports for Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman (MBS)’s Vision 2030 agenda see it is business as usual, Riyadh continues to struggle to address criticism of its record on human rights and financial abuses.

Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) owners of land and real estate in Oman have been given until November 2020 to sell up, under the terms of a little-noticed royal decree. Until now the prevailing rule among the six Gulf monarchies has been that the citizens of one GCC country are permitted to buy property in another. However, Royal Decree 29/2018 introduced a series of prohibitions on foreigners owning land and property in designated areas and ordered them to sell such property to Omanis.

An unexpected reshuffle of senior officials on 27 December, along with the trial of 11 unnamed individuals for the murder of dissident journalist Jamal Khashoggi, has sent a clear signal that King Salman Bin Abdelaziz is determined to protect his son Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman (MBS) from any fallout from the killing, while also trying to rebuild Saudi Arabia’s standing on the world stage.

The Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) summit was again overshadowed by the crisis pitting Qatar against the GCC-3 of Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and the UAE (GSN 1,040/1). Qatar attended the 9 December summit – although Emir Sheikh Tamim Bin Hamad Al-Thani was one of three heads of state who stayed away from the annual meeting, this year held in Riyadh – but 18 months after the GCC-3’s boycott was launched against Doha it is becoming ever harder to paper over the cracks of regional disunity. There was no sign of any unexpected radical shift in key leaders’ thinking, leaving a consensus that the one-day summit had achieved nothing other than to entrench existing positions.

Matthew Hedges’ release from a life sentence in the United Arab Emirates, following a presidential pardon on 26 November, came as a great relief to his family – led by his wife Daniela Tejeda – and to his many academic and other supporters. However, his ordeal has raised important questions about the state of bilateral relations between the UAE and United Kingdom, as well as concerns for the safety of academics, consultants, journalists and others working in the region, who often need to ask searching questions in the course of their work.

Emir Sheikh Tamim Bin Hamad Al-Thani reshuffled his 14-member cabinet, created a number of new government bodies and appointed new leaders at key state-run institutions, including the Qatar Investment Authority (QIA), Qatar Petroleum (QP) and the Qatar Financial Markets Authority (QFMA) in a string of 4 November decrees.

Observers have become accustomed in recent years to using Sultan Qaboos Bin Said Al-Said’s public appearances at National Day festivities to assess the Omani leader’s health. This year, 18 November is likely to lead to a reassessment of his condition, four years after Qaboos began treatment for colon cancer in Germany; he only finally returned to Muscat in 2016, after a long period of recuperation. GSN has spoken to a number of senior officials who have had recent contact with the sultan: the consensus seems to be that Qaboos’ health has improved significantly since 2016. He has put on weight, his face is noticeably less gaunt and “the spark has returned to his eyes”, as one observer put it.

Riyadh is still in crisis recovery mode as the regime triesto find a way to explain the disappearance and apparent murder of prominent critic Jamal Khashoggi, after his visit to the Saudi consulate in Istanbul, Turkey on 2 October. While Riyadh initially claimed Khashoggi – who in the past year had been a periodic columnist for the Washington Post – had left the building, it was unable to provide any evidence of that; Saudi spokesmen were unable to counter speculation that Khashoggi was brutally murdered by a team of Saudi agents that flew into Istanbul that day.