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Yemen is in a very fragile state. After 33 years of rule, president Ali Abdullah Saleh relinquished power in February 2012, and the nation entered a transitional period, intended to be two years long and to steer Yemen towards democracy and stability. It is running considerably behind schedule. Saleh’s successor, Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi, has inherited a nation beset by violence and competing factions.

On 11 March, Crown Prince Salman Bin Hamad Al-Khalifa was appointed ‘first deputy premier for the development and performance of the executive authority’s bodies’, a move widely perceived as conciliatory towards the opposition. On 10 February, the government and opposition groups began a National Consensus Dialogue. Violence flared again on the 14 February anniversary of the uprising (and has again since), but talks have not been derailed, a measure of the seriousness on all sides.

Relations with Qatar have deteriorated sharply. Tensions have been building since 2011, due to conflicting views on the Muslim Brotherhood, which Abu Dhabi sees as a threat and Doha has been supporting. In February, the UAE summoned the Qatari ambassador to make a formal complaint about Doha-based Islamist cleric Yusuf Al-Qaradawi’s criticism of the UAE rulers. Then, on 5 March, the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain all withdrew their ambassadors from Qatar, saying Qatar had refused to abide by the terms of an agreement signed by the Gulf Co-operation Council member states three months earlier – something Qatar denies.

On 25 June, Sheikh Hamad abdicated in favour of his son, heir apparent Sheikh Tamim Bin Hamad Al-Thani. The move was expertly stagemanaged: rumours of a handover had been circulating for months, and it was portrayed as a transfer to a dynamic next generation. In his final address as leader, 61-year-old Hamad spoke of the “original and creative initiatives” of Qatar’s youth, and said it was time to “usher in a new era”.

Charismatic ruler Sheikh Mohammed Bin Rashid Al-Maktoum (MBR) is the architect of today’s Dubai. Named federal vice president and prime minister in 2006, he helped increase the role of Dubai in federal affairs, which had been overwhelmingly dominated by Abu Dhabi’s Al-Nahyan.

The Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) states have more than a dozen sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) between them, managing assets worth an estimated $2.77trn. As of 12 August 2015, this represented a staggering 38% of the total $7.28trn assets managed by SWFs around the world, according to the calculations of the Las Vegas-based Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute (SWFI).

Kuwait has been governed by the Al-Sabah family since the 18th century. It gained independence from Britain in 1961; a new constitution written that year confirmed the hereditary monarchy, but gave significant powers to an independent judiciary and an elected assembly. The emir – currently Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmed Al-Sabah – retains the final say and political parties are banned. But the 50-member assembly has proven more vibrant than expected, and Kuwait has often been held up as a beacon for democratisation in the region. Friction between the elected parliament and the appointed government has been an ongoing problem.

Kuwait has often been held up as a beacon for democratisation in the region. Friction between the elected parliament and the appointed government has been an ongoing problem, however, often resulting in paralysis of the state. Parliament has twice been shut down – from 1976 to 1981 and from 1986 to 1992 – and there have been three elections in the past 18 months.

Kuwait has been governed by the Al-Sabah family since the 18th century. It gained independence from Britain in 1961; a new constitution written that year confirmed the hereditary monarchy, but gave significant powers to an independent judiciary and an elected assembly. The emir – currently Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmed Al-Sabah – retains final say, and political parties are banned. But the 50-member assembly has proven vibrant, and Kuwaiti politics the most participatory in the Gulf. The downside of this experiment in partial democracy has been the constant friction between the elected parliament and the appointed government, which has often resulted in paralysis of the state.

Politics: Disagreements between the autonomous Kurdish Region of Iraq (KRI) and the federal Iraqi government in Baghdad have been a source of major tensions. The 2005 constitution gave the KRI an identity distinct from Iraq, as a federal entity recognised by Iraq and the United Nations; the 2010 Erbil agreement outlined how power would be shared. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has long protested these agreements’ lack of implementation. Oil has been central to disputes: Baghdad was furious that Erbil signed production-sharing agreements unilaterally with international oil companies (IOCs) and opposed the KRG’s efforts to export oil without passing through the central State Marketing Organisation (Somo).

Disagreements between the autonomous Kurdish region and Baghdad have been a source of major tensions in recent years. The 2005 constitution stipulated that Iraqi Kurdistan, which has an identity distinct from Iraq, is a federal entity recognised by Iraq and the United Nations, and the 2010 Erbil agreement with Baghdad outlined how power would be shared. But the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has protested their lack of implementation, and relations with Baghdad have been highly acrimonious. Oil has been at the centre of the dispute, with Baghdad furious that Erbil signed production-sharing agreements with international oil companies (IOCs) without its say-so, and Kurdistan wanting to export oil independently rather than through the central State Organisation for the Marketing of Oil (SOMO). The Kurds accused former prime minister Nouri Al-Maliki of assuming too many powers, and have threatened to hold a referendum on independence. The appointment of Prime Minister Haider Al-Abadi has led to some improvement in the Baghdad/Erbil relationship. But the advance of the Islamic State (IS) jihadist group has been a major security and financial challenge for the Kurds. More than 1,000 members of the regional Peshmerga force have been killed, and the region is struggling to cope with a massive influx of refugees from the Iraqi and Syrian conflicts.

While Al-Thani rule has been largely uncontested by other leading families in the emirate, there has been some instability as different politicised alliances vied for power over the decades. Limited democracy is being slowly introduced. Since 1999, elections have been held for a Central Municipal Council, but voter disillusionment has been reflected in falling turnout.

Iran’s nuclear programme remains at the heart of its troubled relationship with the West.Attempts to find a diplomatic solution have yet to make any significant progress

Iran was declared an Islamic Republic in 1979, following the overthrow of the shah. The supreme leader, currently Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, sits at the top of the political system, his power checked by an elected president and parliament; the conflict between theocracy and democracy dictates much of the internal dynamic. In 2009, massive protests about alleged vote-rigging in a presidential election that saw the re-election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad prompted a brutal crackdown on reformists; the June 2013 election of cleric Hassan Rouhani, who is seen as more moderate than Ahmadinejad, has raised hopes that some degree of political freedom may return.

At the top of each emirate are the rulers’ courts and their crown princes. In practice, only the rulers of Abu Dhabi and Dubai make unilateral decisions and issue emiri decrees; most of the smaller emirates use legislation crafted at federal level. Abu Dhabi, Dubai and Sharjah all have executive councils (Dubai’s is relatively informal).Abu Dhabi and Sharjah have national consultative councils, whose usefulness (like the Federal National Council) has been questioned.