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The result of the United States’ presidential election has put in doubt the future of the July 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), under which Iran suspended its uranium enrichment programme in return for a relaxation of sanctions. If President-elect Donald Trump’s administration follows through on his campaign pledge to rip up the deal and retighten the sanctions regime, the US will likely encounter resistance from its Russian, Chinese and European co-signatories, all of whom are being courted ever more assiduously by Tehran.

Gulf Co-operation Council states have long been the focus of efforts by US administrations and their regional military structure Central Command (Centcom) to enforce the Pax Americana. But with some GCC allies already feeling distanced from high-level contacts in Washington, the resignation of General Stanley McChrystal as head of US Forces and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, and his replacement by Centcom commander General David Petraeus, threatens to leave them feeling even more distanced from the US civil-military relationship.

The narrative for Iran’s passage from Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi’s modernising, economically rational nuclear programme of the 1950s-70s to one capable of delivering an atomic bomb has been marked by persistent delays and a profound lack of intelligence – and understanding – of players’ intentions.

Donald Trump clearly chose his ground during his first foreign visit as US president, with the view of enunciating a simple but assertive foreign policy message for the Middle East. In Riyadh and Jerusalem he chose to focus on rallying his Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) allies, led by Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi, and their erstwhile enemy Israel, with a unifying call to confront Iran – which has been confirmed in the Trumpian vision as the pre-eminent regional villain.

Maysan province provides a pointer to the evolution of politics and security under Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki, in the Bush administration’s last months, where huge resources are needed to assist the traumatised, impoverished population in arguably Iraq’s most under-developed and wildest province.

On 20 April, Iraq held its first countrywide elections since the withdrawal of US troops in late 2011. The vote for provincial councils, widely touted as a litmus test for Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki ahead of parliamentary elections in 2014, was seen also as a test of how well Iraq’s political institutions and security forces could handle nationwide polls.

Two days after the UAE Armed Forces suffered two separate fatal aircraft crashes, minister of state for foreign affairs Anwar Gargash unilaterally declared that the UAE had completed its mission in Yemen and that its involvement in the Saudi-led coalition had changed focus – from a military campaign to civil development. Details of the military withdrawal had yet to be revealed as GSN went to press, but UAE forces are expected to be repatriated in phases over the next few months. There was no immediate comment from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Co-operation Council allies.

In his new book, 25 Days to Aden, regional risk and security expert Michael Knights – a former contributor to GSN – has offered an unprecedented view of the UAE as a rising, and effective, military power, as it became embroiled in the Yemen conflict.

It was on the occasion of Queen Victoria’s Diamond Jubilee in 1897 that Rudyard Kipling penned his ‘Recessional’, a hymnic warning about the inevitable decline of the British Empire. “Lo, all our pomp of yesterday/ Is one with Nineveh and Tyre!/Judge of the Nations, spare us yet,/Lest we forget – lest we forget!” wrote the poet of the Empire, as Britain’s redoubtable monarch marked 60 years on the throne.

Whether President Barack Obama should have carried through on his threat to intervene in Syria when evidence of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) were revealed in 2013, or if Western allies should have been more robust in projecting their interests in building a post-Qadhafi state in Libya, remain live issues today. The fact that neither happened can be traced directly to the catalogue of disasters that began with the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003; an ignominious chapter of recent western history which has now been elegantly and intensively recorded in Sir John Chilcot’s Report of the Iraq Inquiry, which covers the UK’s involvement from mid-2001 until its troops formally withdrew in July 2009.

The images and tales that emerged from Al-Shabaab’s attack on Kenya’s Westgate mall were searingly dreadful. Mothers shielding toddlers, blood pooling on tiles, the sheer terror of gunfire in what was supposed to be a benign location. Rarely has the vocabulary of winning been so unconsonant. “We have defeated our enemies,” Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta declared as the four-day siege came to an end on 24 September, leaving at least 70 people dead. For all the bravery of security forces, for all the unity of horrified Kenyans, it is wrong to suggest that anyone wins.

GSN’s year-end Perspective/Agenda feature provides a look back – and forwards – at key events across the region in 2020-21. It gives an opportunity to update the Risk Grades included with each of our regular Risk management reports. After another year of tragedy, Yemen is effectively a failed state (rated F6, the bottom political and financial grades). Qatar has shown itself to be robust in the face of its neighbours’ boycott, its finances warranting an upgrade to 1, putting it on a par with the UAE. Iraq’s political standoffs and financial woes remain deeply troubling, but the situation is improving rather than deteriorating and the prospect of higher oil prices next year should help further; it has been upgraded from E5↑ to D4↓. Oman’s fiscal challenges continue to mount, prompting a downgrade of its economic rating to 3. 

An attempt by GCC secretary-general Nayef Al-Hajraf to convene a fresh round of dialogue in Riyadh for Yemen war belligerents appears to have failed, with the Houthis refusing to take part. However, there are signs of further Saudi-inspired political initiatives to break the stalemate on the ground, which could have significant consequences for President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi and the wider political process.

Protestors have refused to stand down in the face of sometimes overwhelming state force in the seven weeks since Mahsa Amini died in custody. The movement’s support base has spread across the country and into parts of society not usually associated with political demonstrations, putting Ayatollah Ali Khamenei under unprecedented pressure. His regime is not yet facing the end, but the challenge to the clerical/military leadership will not fade easily or quickly.

Even while Iranian diplomatic efforts are focused on talks with global powers to revive the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) – the nuclear deal whose revival would significantly improve the economic outlook – the domestic situation remains fragile.