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In contrast to the UAE’s public withdrawal from Yemen – where Emirati military forces formally pulled out last October, although it has retained a less widely publicised presence, notably on the islands of Socotra and Mayyun – Oman has steadily increased its influence in the worn-torn state.

Despite all his efforts to project a more modern, tolerant and less corrupt image of Saudi royalty, unhelpful stories continue to buzz around Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman (MBS), in the process undermining his hopes of recasting the image of his country and its ruling dynasty. In the days leading up to his protracted visit to the United States, which began on 20 March, stories broke in the international media which take at least some of the sheen off his carefully-curated reformist image.

 There is mounting evidence of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman (MBS)’s recent appreciation of diplomatic endeavours, which is apparent in the revelations of talks with Iran in Baghdad (GSN 1,124/17), renewed attempts to secure a peace deal in Yemen, signs of a reset of relations with Syria and Turkey and the Al-Ula agreement in January, which ended the Qatar boycott.

While America and Europe continue to present a united front in response to Russia’s war in Ukraine, the UAE’s more ambivalent stance continues to cause concern in western capitals – and has the potential to undermine, or at least complicate, the country’s diplomatic and commercial relations with the United States and its allies.

British Prime Minister David Cameron was back in the UAE for the third time in as many years on 16 November, this time heading to Dubai just ahead of the 17-21 November Dubai Airshow (see page 14). There was immediate political gain to be had from the UAE’s deals with Airbus, worth more than $60bn. A380 wings are designed and assembled at UK sites in Filton and Broughton, part of an Airbus programme worth around $24bn to the UK economy; Cameron has made considerable noise about revitalising relationships with the Gulf, and was able to conclude that the new deals resulted from this effort.

The Gulf Co-operation Council states are in a more delicate and divided condition than they have been for decades – a set of circumstances which presents significant opportunities for Iran. However, understanding how and where Tehran might try to exploit their discomfort is as difficult as ever. An analysis of Iran’s understanding of its key enemies’ weaknesses and the Iranian military machine’s most relevant capabilities might help.

Prince Turki Al-Faisal has again shown his capacity to express Saudi policy concerns that go beyond the platitudes that too often pass for political discourse in the Gulf, this time discussing concerns about Iran’s nuclear ambitions and interference in regional conflict zones. Turki speaks with authority,

There was a lull in the speculation over the potential bombing of Iran by the United States or - more likely - its ally Israel, with the world transfixed by Barak Obama's victory in the US presidential election. Talk of significant offensive action against Tehran became intense during the late summer, with two theories circulating on the eventuality of a strike to knock out Iran's nuclear facilities and perhaps other targets. One theory was that the outgoing Bush administration would sanction a strike as its last neo-conservative hurrah; and, two, that Israel would be emboldened to act. In September, UK daily The Guardian, added to the debate by publishing details of documents showing how Washington had sought to rein in Israeli hawks who were ready to attack.

President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad garnered moral backing during his mid-January voyage around five of Latin America’s ‘anti-imperialist’ states, but he seems to have come away with little material support to counter Iran’s growing crisis of international isolation – underlined on 23 January, when European Union foreign ministers agreed on the much-anticipated embargo on Iranian oil imports (effective from 1 July).

Bahrain’s legally registered political groups are working to shore up their vote and persuade their constituencies they remain worthy of support ahead of National Assembly and municipal elections scheduled for this year, probably November. Much attention has been paid to parties supported by the Shia majority, led by Al-Wefaq National Islamic Society, which holds 17 of the 40 Majlis Al-Nawab (Chamber of Deputies) seats.

The decision by President Donald Trump to effectively refrain from intervening in a meaningful way in Middle East affairs – upending decades of United States policy – continues to have significant ramifications for the Gulf. As former UK ambassador to Saudi Arabia Sir John Jenkins wrote recently in Arab News: “We are watching the political geography of the Middle East being reshaped before our eyes.” Events in recent weeks bear out his point, particularly in relation to Saudi Arabia.

Bahrain’s National Dialogue concluded on 30 July with three concrete recommendations and a lot more woolly statements presented to King Hamad Bin Isa Al-Khalifa (GSN 905/4). If robustly implemented, these measures could eventually lead to more representative, tolerant government and greater transparency, in a system where a wider range of Bahraini voices are heard and officials are brought to account for abuses (with ministers potentially facing Kuwait-style ‘grillings’ in parliament).

The three-year, slow-burning conflict in Bahrain remains a minor headache to most international governments, in a region full of thumping migraines. But as l’affaire Malinowksi reminded us this month, for all the West’s efforts to coax the Al-Khalifa into submission with the vocabulary of “longstanding bilateral relationships” and “strong partnerships”, the problem of Bahrain will not fade away.

A rare strike by Kuwaiti oil workers began on 17 April, with members of the Union of Petroleum and Petrochemical Workers protesting against changes that could lead to cuts in salaries and other benefits (see Politics). It was notable that only Kuwaiti workers went on strike: foreigners showed up for work as usual – which makes sense given the vulnerable position of overseas labourers in Kuwait, as in other GCC economies. The strike highlights the difficulty Gulf governments face in making changes to their bloated public sectors, at a time when they are struggling to deal with growing budget deficits.

The late January appointment of Emiri Diwan chief Sheikh Khalid Bin Khalifa Bin Abdelaziz Bin Jassim Bin Mohammed Al-Thani as Qatar’s prime minister marks a further stage in the growing centralisation of power around the Emiri Diwan since 2013, when Sheikh Tamim Bin Hamad Al-Thani took over from his now ‘father emir’, Sheikh Hamad Bin Khalifa Al Thani. In keeping with the style of Emir Sheikh Tamim’s rule, the transition from long-serving prime minister and interior minister Sheikh Abdullah Bin Nasser Bin Khalifa Al-Thani’s safe pair of hands at the head of government to Khalid Bin Khalifa was a low key affair.