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The results released so far of elections on 26 February to the Majles-e Showra-ye Eslami (Islamic Consultative Assembly or parliament) and Majles-e Khobregan (Assembly of Experts) seemed to confirm that President Hassan Rouhani had emerged stronger from his nuclear deal with the P5+1 grouping of global powers. It suggested the clerical establishment – with Rahbar (Supreme Leader) Ayatollah Ali Khamenei (pictured smiling, almost winsomely, as he placed his vote) at its peak – was sanctioning a political shift towards more open, tolerant government. This would be despite the opposition of arch conservatives and revolutionary institutions such as the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC).

The decision by the Shura-ye Negahban (Guardian Council) to cull all but seven names from the list of 592 people who had registered to run in the presidential election on 18 June was, on the surface, unsurprising.

Will Mohammad Khatami secure the backing of Rahbar (Supreme Leader) Ayatollah Ali Khamenei for his presidential comeback bid this summer? Unlikely as this might have seemed even weeks ago, Iranian political observers, whose debates GSN has joined in the past week, are agreed that this may be the decisive question

None of the Gulf’s emerging ´middle powers’ have issued a detailed policy document setting out their approach to projecting soft power, even as they continue to spend extravagantly while drawing in investment and talent. Autocracies have no real need to orchestrate the sort of public debate that might follow, even if they regularly sound out local opinion via traditional diwans or more modern polling techniques — not to mention ever more pervasive surveillance of their citizens and others’ communications.

The fourth election in as many years seems unlikely to lead to any dramatic change in Kuwait’s slow-burning political crisis, as most members of the outgoing parliament retained their seats and Abdulkarim Al-Kandari – whose comments about Emir Sheikh Mishaal precipitated the latest poll – increased his vote, suggesting voters were happy to reward the authorities’ outspoken critics.

Being a small country surrounded by larger feuding neighbours is never a comfortable place to be. Bahrain has been working hard to build a stronger relationship with US President Donald Trump, both as part of its alignment with Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi, but also on its own account, reinforcing wider alliances as a bolster against a resurgent Iran across the Gulf and with a restive majority Shia population at home.

It should come as no surprise that Sudan’s internationally wanted President Omar Al Bashir visited Qatar and Saudi Arabia in early March, where he was welcomed with an open disregard for the arrest warrant issued for him by the International Criminal Court (which the United Nations has urged even non-signatory countries to co-operate with).

With further concerns about the health of Emir Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmed Al-Jaber Al-Sabah, following his admission to hospital in the United States during September, attention is inevitably turning to the often-intricate politics of succession in Kuwait.In the country’s modern history, succession within the ruling Al-Sabah family has been marked by the custom that the emir is picked in turn from the two main branches of the family.

Controversy has erupted in Saudi Arabia over the position of Ahmed Al-Ghamdi, head of the Mecca branch of the Commission for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice. He first hit the headlines late last year after an interview in Okaz newspaper in which he spoke openly about ikhtilat, the mixing of unrelated men and women,

On 14 November in Beijing, state-owned Saudi Arabian Oil Company (Saudi Aramco) announced the official opening of Aramco Asia, a wholly owned affiliate of Saudi Aramco headquartered in the Chinese capital, and intended to serve as the “business and cultural exchange portal between Saudi Aramco and China”.

The Yemen conflict, and its complex blend of local and regional alliances, seems to be shifting into a new phase, which does not yet hold out the promise of peace for the tortured country. While the uneasy alliance of Houthi rebels and former president Ali Abdullah Saleh unravels in Sanaa, Saudi Arabia is increasingly taking over the UAE’s leading role in southern Yemen. Meanwhile, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and Islamic State (IS) jihadists are making new tribal alliances that entrench their influence.

Two years into his presidency, Nicolas Sarkozy is starting to reap the rewards of an election night promise to place the Middle East among the key priorities of French foreign policy. Arab governments now see Paris as a key point of contact and leverage, a useful counterpoint to their traditionally close relations with Washington, and a strategic ally in propping up the peace process and countering the strategic challenge posed by Iran.

The Abu Dhabi ruling family has earned international respect for its discreet behaviour and traditionally unostentatious stewardship of its huge wealth, so that some senior Al-Nahyan were genuinely embarrassed at the media circus surrounding Sheikh Mansour Bin Zayed’s takeover of British football club Manchester City.

It takes time for things to happen in Saudi Arabia. It was back in 2011 that King Abdullah Bin Abdelaziz announced women would be appointed to the Majlis Al-Shura, and on 11 January, 30 women duly were. A royal order specified women were to constitute “no less than 20%” of the council, which is selected by the king and serves as an advisory body.

It has long been fashionable in Iraq to state that Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf Co-Operation Council states represent a ‘hidden hand’ in Iraqi politics, backing various potential proxies by bankrolling their campaigns. The renewed prominence of Iyad Allawi has strengthened this view, leading many Iraqi politicians and commentators to complain about the degree of Saudi influence over the political campaigns of Sunni groups like Allawi’s Iraqiya list.