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Published in July 2021, this map of Oman shows governorate boundaries, international airports, roads, oil and gas fields and pipelines, oil refineries, gas processing plants, oil tanker terminals and LNG liquefaction plant and export terminals. There is also a box which offers a close up view of the Strait of Hormuz which includes shipping lane diagrams.  The map is available as a PDF file using eps graphics, meaning that there is no loss of resolution as the file is enlarged.

Updated in October 2021, this map provides a detailed overview of the hydrocarbons sector in Oman. Open and licensed acreage is shown, with block operators and oil and gas fields marked, alongside associated downstream infrastructure such as pipelines, tanker terminals, refineries, gas processing plants and LNG facilities. The map is available as a PDF file using eps graphics, meaning that there is no loss of resolution as the file is enlarged.

Revised January 2022, this map illustrates Oman's major infrastructure. The main map shows the country's governorate boundaries, major road network and international airports (with their IATA codes). The locations of onshore and offshore oil and gas/condensate fields and pipelines are marked alongside associated infrastructure including oil refineries, gas processing plants, tanker terminals and LNG facilities. An inset illustrates the Musandam peninsula, offshore oil and gas acreage and the shipping lanes through the Strait of Hormuz. The map is available as a PDF file using eps graphics, meaning that there is no loss of resolution as the file is enlarged.

The recent tour of the GCC states by US Secretary of Defense William Cohen had a number of familiar features. Perceived widely in the Arab world as the latest US attempt to sell arms through scare-mongering about Iraq and Iran, the tour inflamed the Arab press. Worse yet, it drew attention to growing Arab uneasiness over the escalating Anglo-American air strikes against Iraq.

Anew countdown has begun for Iran’s relations with the world. Following President Donald Trump’s heavily telegraphed 8 May decision that the United States would no longer honour its commitments under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the US is set to reinstate the sanctions on Iran it dropped in January 2016 when the nuclear deal was implemented.

Less than a week after the death of his half-brother Abdullah (GSN 985, special issue), Saudi Arabia’s new king, Salman Bin Abdelaziz Al-Saud, announced generous handouts to citizens and made sweeping changes to the apparatus and personnel of government, demoting several of the late king’s sons and promoting his own. In a series of decrees issued on 29 January, King Salman detailed extensive appointments and institutional changes which must have been long in the planning; while many of the changes were not surprising, the rapidity of their execution was, catching many in Riyadh off guard.

The visit to London later this month by Prince Sultan bin Abdul Aziz, the Saudi Defence Minister and 2nd Deputy Premier, will, once again, focus attention on the biggest deal ever concluded by Saudi Arabia and Britain. The defence deal initiated in 1985 and now known as Al Yamamah Project, was Saudi Arabia's multi-million pound purchase of Tornado combat aircraft, training aircraft, helicopters, mine-hunter ships, the construction in the Kingdom of major defence bases and wide-ranging support and training programmes.

King Hussein of Jordan ended five days of private talks in Washington with no indications of any breakthrough in the attempts towards an overall Middle East peace process. The Jordanian king's visit was partly overshadowed by the Israeli raid on the PLO headquarters in Tunisia, which raised serious questions among both US and Jordanian officials about the prospects of further PLO involvement in the peace process.

The 13th Meeting of the GCC Defence Ministers, held in Riyadh from 12 to 14 November, once again ended with proposals for joint activities which are likely to remain unfulfilled. Since its formation in 1981 the GCC has spoken of the need to bolster defence cooperation and coordination but internal disagreements have meant that the organisation has so far been unable to achieve progress in this respect either at the strategic or at the operational level.

THE AMERICAN IDEA of a Rapid Deployment Force (RDF), a military response to an external threat to the Middle East, is regarded with considerable disfavour by a majority of the Arab states, A majority, but not all the countries of the region reject the RDF concept. Egypt, the Sudan and Oman have a contrary view and find the RDF a presumably comforting and reassuring factor in their security and defence arrangements.

Deal-making was to the fore during the second part of Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman (MBS)’s threeweek tour around the United States (GSN 1,056/4). Following the initial days in Washington where diplomacy dominated, crossing the continent MBS met the top teams in global giants of the new and old economies. However, it remains to be seen whether he persuaded US business leaders to make the big long-term investments Saudi Arabia needs if his Vision 2030 reform programme is to succeed.

The Gulf Arab countries have a very particular interest in the increasingly complicated issues surrounding the hijacking of the US aircraft and the holding of 37 American hostages by Lebanese Shia militia. A marked absence of official statements from the six states of the Gulf Co-operation Council and, indeed, a dearth of unofficial comment, is a measure of their concern rather than of their indifference.

In the fifth year of the bitter and costly war with Iran, Iraq today appears in better political and military shape than at any time since its heady but short-lived military successes at the beginning of the conflict. As the results of the recent Iranian limited offensive show, Iraq is now able to cope very effectively with Iranian military efforts and, although remaining essentially on the defensive, no longer seems in danger of suffering the catastrophic military defeat that was once predicted by many outside observers.

In a rather surprising announcement at the end of February, Iran said that the Kerbala 5 offensive had been formally called off. Tehran does not usually declare that its major operations are being discontinued. And although it was generally evident that the big Iranian push which started early in January had run out of steam, fresh triumphs were being hailed only a few days before.

The past two weeks have seen two major developments in the Gulf crisis. The United States managed to cajole the UN Security Council into authorising the use of force (euphemistically termed as "all available means") to eject Iraq from Kuwait. Then President Bush announced that he had invited Tareq Aziz, Iraq's foreign minister, to Washington and was willing to send James Baker, the secretary of state, to Baghdad.