Search results

Baghdad has found itself caught in the middle of America’s ‘maximum pressure’ campaign against Iran, as the US tries to restrict Tehran’s access to hard currency via the Iraqi banking system and its electricity exports. While Iraq is still able to buy Iranian gas, Baghdad is scrambling to secure other sources of fuel supplies in case that too is targeted by America.

President Masoud Pezeshkian’s administration has lost two senior figures after finance minister Abdolnaser Hemmati was sacked by parliament and vice president for strategic affairs Mohammad Javad Zarif resigned under pressure from the judiciary chief. The changes suggest hardline factions are flexing their political muscles at a time when the economy is under renewed strain from the Trump administration’s ‘maximum pressure’ campaign.

The initial days of Donald Trump’s second stint in the White House seemed to pick up where his first term left off, with big investments promises by Gulf states to secure the president’s favour. However, deal-making has been quickly overtaken by more strategic concerns and grandiose political posturing, with suggestions the US could force Gaza’s population to move to Jordan, Egypt or even Saudi Arabia, while Trump has renewed his ‘maximum pressure’ campaign on Iran, hinting darkly that Washington could support Israel ‘bombing the hell out of them’.

Emir Sheikh Tamim Bin Hamad Al-Thani was the first head of state to visit post-Assad Damascus, when the Qatari leader flew into the Syrian capital on 30 January, after which President Ahmed Al-Sharaa chose Riyadh for his first overseas trip. Meanwhile Iranian military commanders have emerged from licking their wounds after the Assad regime’s defeat to claim they are now rebuilding resistance cells in their former client state.

The visit by four vessels from the IRGC Navy and the regular Iranian Navy to a port in Sharjah in early February was the first of its kind and is part of a planned exchange of naval visits. It is part of Iran’s efforts to bolster its diplomatic relations with its neighbours and comes as a time when it is also strengthening its domestic defences against potential attacks.

Recent bilateral talks on border security, water resources and the 5m Afghans living in Iran point to a more positive atmosphere between the neighbours – prompting speculation that Tehran could soon recognise the Taliban government. It comes at a time when other Gulf states have been recalibrating their relations with the isolated regime.

Fly Persia, a Shiraz-based airline that operates two ageing Boeing 737 aircraft, has prevailed in a six-year-long trademark dispute with the far larger FlyDubai, after a Luxembourg court ruled their logos weren’t likely to be confused.

In the latest evidence that Tehran’s ‘hostage diplomacy’ is delivering results, an Iranian national was released from an Italian jail before he could be extradited to the US on charges of illegally supplying drone technology to Iran. Relations with France and Switzerland are also strained.

Iran’s supreme leader has endorsed the resubmission of two bills designed to tackle money laundering and terrorism financing to the Expediency Council. A different outcome this time for the legislation – which was previously passed by parliament but was rejected by the Guardian Council and Expediency Council – would offer renewed hope for reformists under President Pezeshkian, while another rejection could cement Iran’s rogue status on the international stage.

Baku has restarted services from a new location in north-east Tehran, almost two years after its embassy was attacked by a gunman.

The dramatic end to Bashir Al-Assad’s rule has created another crisis for Iran’s regional strategy and is an unnerving moment for Gulf monarchies which, in the name of ‘stability’, had been rebuilding ties with a Damascus regime that seemed to have survived a decade-plus of civil war. Diplomatic strategies will now have to be hastily redrawn, with an initial focus on ensuring Syria does not slide further into turmoil.

Iran’s relationship with United Nation’s nuclear watchdog the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and with western powers has soured markedly in recent weeks, in the wake of a visit to Tehran by IAEA chief Rafael Grossi on 14 November. Grossi had been pushing for greater access to Iran by IAEA inspectors and to discuss uranium traces found at a number of sites around the country, but appeared to make little or no progress.

Iranian officials have revived the idea of building a tunnel under the Gulf to Qatar – an idea that previously suggested in 2022. The megaproject would require a tunnel with an underwater section of at least 185km – almost five times further than the current longest submarine tunnel in the world. Officials are due to hold discussions in Doha in the coming weeks, but the limited levels of bilateral trade mean the megaprojects is unlikely to make economic sense.

Gulf rulers welcomed a familiar, if neither always firm nor predictable friend’s victory over the widely mistrusted Biden administration to regain the White House. Plenty of questions remain about what a second Trump term might mean for the Gulf economies and for regional security, and the ‘transactional’ populist’s impulsive approach to policy means it is unlikely to be a smooth ride even for his allies. Trump II could further accelerate trends apparent in recent years, of Gulf states pivoting towards Asia and making ever more assertive expressions of national interest, if still under an American defensive umbrella.

Tehran has launched a housing development on Abu Musa and floated plans for tourism developments on the island, which is part of a trio of islands controlled by Iran but claimed by the UAE. On nearby Greater Tunb, a power plant has also been brought back online after a four-year hiatus.