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Bahrain’s National Dialogue concluded on 30 July with three concrete recommendations and a lot more woolly statements presented to King Hamad Bin Isa Al-Khalifa (GSN 905/4). If robustly implemented, these measures could eventually lead to more representative, tolerant government and greater transparency, in a system where a wider range of Bahraini voices are heard and officials are brought to account for abuses (with ministers potentially facing Kuwait-style ‘grillings’ in parliament).

The three-year, slow-burning conflict in Bahrain remains a minor headache to most international governments, in a region full of thumping migraines. But as l’affaire Malinowksi reminded us this month, for all the West’s efforts to coax the Al-Khalifa into submission with the vocabulary of “longstanding bilateral relationships” and “strong partnerships”, the problem of Bahrain will not fade away.

A rare strike by Kuwaiti oil workers began on 17 April, with members of the Union of Petroleum and Petrochemical Workers protesting against changes that could lead to cuts in salaries and other benefits (see Politics). It was notable that only Kuwaiti workers went on strike: foreigners showed up for work as usual – which makes sense given the vulnerable position of overseas labourers in Kuwait, as in other GCC economies. The strike highlights the difficulty Gulf governments face in making changes to their bloated public sectors, at a time when they are struggling to deal with growing budget deficits.

Any discussion of Saudi politics and business quickly turns to questions about the influence of Al-Saud princes and other key players in the royal pecking order, and who will succeed King Abdullah Bin Abdelaziz. For those seeking to understand the trajectory of Saudi politics, there is meaning to be found (or, at least, sought) in appointments and dismissals. The naming of Prince Mohammed Bin Salman as head of the court of his father Crown Prince Salman, for example, may shed a glimmer of light on what lies ahead for him and other ‘third-generation princes’, as they move closer to the pinnacles of power.

The late January appointment of Emiri Diwan chief Sheikh Khalid Bin Khalifa Bin Abdelaziz Bin Jassim Bin Mohammed Al-Thani as Qatar’s prime minister marks a further stage in the growing centralisation of power around the Emiri Diwan since 2013, when Sheikh Tamim Bin Hamad Al-Thani took over from his now ‘father emir’, Sheikh Hamad Bin Khalifa Al Thani. In keeping with the style of Emir Sheikh Tamim’s rule, the transition from long-serving prime minister and interior minister Sheikh Abdullah Bin Nasser Bin Khalifa Al-Thani’s safe pair of hands at the head of government to Khalid Bin Khalifa was a low key affair.

The Mena region’s polities are very different from the post-colonial nation states and newly independent emirates created during the Cold War that moulded geopolitics in GSN’s formative years. Challenges from non-state actors and the evolution of city-based ‘benign autocracies’ now point to alternative political configurations. It is legitimate to question whether Gulf monarchies based on pre-colonial tribal and family structures will persist beyond the coming decades, in a region buffeted by ‘non-state actors’ such as Islamic State, and riven by sectarian conflicts and demands for a more equitable distribution of resources.

Violence is once again tearing Iraq apart. The fall of Mosul did not just mark the terrifying rise of jihadists from the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL – now calling itself the Islamic State), but also the beginning of a wider Sunni insurgency which has been long in the making: GSN has been writing about Baathists and Salafis pooling resources to fight the government in Baghdad since 2009, in a series of sadly prescient analyses which even anticipated co-operation with Sunni insurgents in Syria.

The result of the United States’ presidential election has put in doubt the future of the July 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), under which Iran suspended its uranium enrichment programme in return for a relaxation of sanctions. If President-elect Donald Trump’s administration follows through on his campaign pledge to rip up the deal and retighten the sanctions regime, the US will likely encounter resistance from its Russian, Chinese and European co-signatories, all of whom are being courted ever more assiduously by Tehran.

The narrative for Iran’s passage from Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi’s modernising, economically rational nuclear programme of the 1950s-70s to one capable of delivering an atomic bomb has been marked by persistent delays and a profound lack of intelligence – and understanding – of players’ intentions.

The internet has made news more opinionated than ever. With the tools of propaganda so close to hand, every story has become a chain of claim and counter-claim, of accusation and denial. On partisan news channels, in press releases emailed to inboxes across the globe, in the deceptively informal forums of social media, it is possible not only to peddle one’s version of history, but to spread it wide. Nowhere is the conflict of recorded histories more evident than in countries where governments seek to keep a lid on freedom of expression.

Sultan Haitham Bin Tariq Al-Said’s decision to merge the State General Reserve Fund (SGRF) and the Oman Investment Fund (OIF) – announced via a royal decree on 4 June – brings to an end a debate that has rumbled on since 2017. The new Oman Investment Authority (OIA) will combine the $14.3bn of assets held by the SGRF and $3.4bn from the OIF. To be independent of the Ministry of Finance (MoF), the new entity will report directly to the Council of Ministers.

Heightened tensions with the United States since President Donald Trump came to power in 2017 have undermined the Iranian economy, squeezing many incomes to breaking point. Much worse could be to come. The steady escalation underlined by the killing of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corp (IRGC)’s Quds Force commander General Qassim Soleimani and attacks on US facilities in Iraq could yet lead to all-out conflict, despite calls for cool heads and de-escalation.

Donald Trump clearly chose his ground during his first foreign visit as US president, with the view of enunciating a simple but assertive foreign policy message for the Middle East. In Riyadh and Jerusalem he chose to focus on rallying his Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) allies, led by Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi, and their erstwhile enemy Israel, with a unifying call to confront Iran – which has been confirmed in the Trumpian vision as the pre-eminent regional villain.

The British press has been engaged in feverish speculation about the precise identity and wealth of an Al-Nahyan sheikh ever since tabloid daily The Sun broke the news on 26 May that Newcastle United owner and retailing magnate Mike Ashley had agreed to sell the Premier League football club to Sheikh Khaled Bin Zayed Bin Saqr for £350m. The ‘red-top’ labelled Khaled as a “Dubai-based billionaire… among the most successful entrepreneurs in the Gulf states”. Another tabloid, The Mirror, speculated that, although his personal wealth was unknown, “his family is thought to be worth around £150bn”.

Kuwait, like many Gulf states, has been grappling with how best to deal with sociAl networking sites such as Twitter, which have given wings to dissent that in the past would not have left the realms of private conversation.