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The accusation that UAE war planes flew sorties from Egyptian air bases in mid- to late August to bomb pro-Islamist militia forces in the Libyan capital of Tripoli fits a wider trend of speculation about Gulf states’ involvement in Libya’s slow-burn civil war. But the allegation is far from proven, despite having originally come from United States government officials. Suggestions that the failing North African state is becoming an arena for a regional proxy war between the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Egypt on one side and Qatar on the other are also exaggerated.

On 8 July, Houthi tribal fighters in Yemen overran the provincial capital of Amran, seizing the headquarters of the 310th Armoured Brigade, and installing themselves in the city. More than 200 people were killed in the fighting, and many more wounded. Tens of thousands of citizens fled the fighting, seeking refuge in other parts of the province, or moving towards Sanaa, just 50km away.

Iraqis used to point to electricity supply problems as an endemic issue under Saddam Hussein, but they did not go away with the US-led invasion. Shortfalls in power services have added to disillusionment with Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki’s government, and are now challenging the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) which – along with Sunni allies – has seized large swathes of Iraq, renaming itself the Islamic State, and triumphantly claiming its leader, Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, is the caliph of Muslims everywhere.

The blame game began within hours of Sunni extremists taking Mosul (see page 1). Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki blamed members of the army for deserting, saying the seizure of the city was a “conspiracy”. Saudi Arabia blamed Iranian-backed Maliki, with information minister Abdelaziz Bin Mohieddin Khoja saying: “This would not have arisen were it not for the sectarian and exclusionary policies practised in Iraq over the past years”. Former British prime minister Tony Blair blamed the civil war in Syria (and definitely not the 2003 invasion of Iraq of which he was a primary architect). Writing in The Wall Street Journal on 15 June, L Paul Bremer, the former US governor of Iraq, tried to pin it on US President Barack Obama, who, he said, pulled US forces out of Iraq too soon.

The fall of Mosul to jihadists from the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL, or ISIS) on 10 June has sent shockwaves through the region and beyond. As the Sunni insurgents advanced from their strongholds in Al-Anbar, the Iraqi army seemed to melt away, allowing ISIL to extend its gains in the north, the Kurds to step into the vacuum in their coveted Kirkuk, and militias to proliferate on both sides of the Sunni/Shiite divide. Within days, the US said it was contemplating air strikes, as Iraq lunged back into deep sectarian conflict. At the time of writing, militants from ISIL controlled a significant number of towns in Nineveh, Salahaddin and northern Diyala, including Saddam Hussein’s home town of Tikrit and Tal Afar, between Mosul and the border with Syria, where ISIL also controls a swathe of territory. Iraq’s biggest oil refinery at Bayji had been shut down and was under attack by militants, and there was fighting in Baquba, just 60km north of Baghdad

Tensions between President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi and his predecessor Ali Abdullah Saleh arguably reached an all-time high in mid-June. On 11 June, Hadi ordered presidential guard troops to raid the offices and studios of Al-Yemen Al-Youm television, which is part-owned by the Saleh family. CCTV footage shows soldiers searching the building; media outlets close to Saleh – who is still sitting president of the General People’s Congress (GPC) – said Hadi had ordered the station’s temporary closure in his capacity as secretary-general of the GPC. GPC deputy secretary-general Sultan Al-Barakani was quoted as saying Hadi, with the cabinet’s approval, also subsequently temporarily shut down Al-Yemen Al-Youm newspaper.It is not clear why the media were closed, but the motivation appears to be political. The GPC has a 49% stake in Al-Yemen Al-Youm media, which includes a radio station. The rest is owned by Ahmed Ali Abdullah Saleh and his cousin Yahya Mohammed Saleh. If Hadi’s decision was linked to an internal party matter – as many suspect – the use of government troops is highly controversial.

More than a month into a military offensive against Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in south Yemen, a second front has reignited as government forces engage Houthi rebels in Amran Province, north of Sanaa. Armed clashes there had receded after a late March ceasefire between Houthi elements and tribal militias loyal to Bayt Al-Ahmar and the Al-Islah party. But the ceasefire was short-lived as the Houthis accused the army’s 310 Brigade, led by General Hamid Al-Qushaibi, of initiating aggressive manoeuvres near Houthi positions around the city of Amran.

The Syrian National Coalition (SNC)’s Saudi-backed leadership made its first official visit to Washington in May, seeking greater US support in its war against President Bashar Al-Assad. SNC President Ahmad Jarba and his military chief, Brigadier General Abdulillah Al-Bashir – who heads the Supreme Joint Military Command Council (SMC) – came away from their 5-14 May meetings with promises of $27m of new non-lethal assistance, and that the SNC’s representative offices in the US would now be considered foreign missions. The move – which does not allow the SNC to take over the Syrian embassy, or assume the status of government – is certainly a boost to the SNC’s credibility.

When Sheikh Ali Bawazeer, a cleric known for his anti-Al-Qaeda sermons, was assassinated in Hadhramaut in February, his death was largely assumed to be the result of his preaching. But sources in Sanaa say his death stemmed from a rift within AQAP offshoot Ansar Al-Sharia (AAS) over its priorities in the province. Bawazeer seems to have been part of an AAS wing which prioritised the establishment of Islamic emirates in Al-Shahr and Ghayl Bawazeer districts, bringing him into friction with another AAS wing following orders from AQAP leader Qassim Al-Raimi, who is said to have issued a fatwa authorising the assassination of security officials.

In late March, the media arm of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), Al-Malahim, posted a video online of a large gathering of AQAP leaders and members, a bold show of numbers and force which included Nasir Al-Wahayshi, who is the head of AQAP and widely seen as the Al-Qaeda number two. The video, entitled ‘First of the Heavy Rain’, is thought to have been shot in Marib province. It shows a reception for the 29 convicted members of AQAP who escaped from Sanaa Central Prison on 13 February, their prison break apparently the fulfilment, in part at least, of Al-Wahayshi’s August 2013 promise to release brothers imprisoned in Yemen, made around the time of mass prison breaks in Iraq, Pakistan and Libya.

Security is deteriorating in the southern province of Lahij, which stretches from Bab Al-Mandab almost to the port of Aden. Southern Movement (Al-Hirak) activists in Aden tell GSN that Lahij is rapidly falling into lawlessness as conflict increases between residents and government security forces. Towns such as the provincial capital Al-Houta, formerly known as Lahij, are also suffering spillover from the neighbouring province of Abyan, as elements of Ansar Al-Sharia (AAS), an affiliate of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), move west into Lahij.

As Saudi Arabia turns its attention increasingly to citizens fighting in Syria and other conflicts abroad, Kuwaiti newspapers have reported that Jazaa Al-Shemmari, the brother of MP Sultan Al-Shemmari, was killed while fighting for the Al-Qaeda-linked Jabhat Al-Nusra. According to the Kuwait Times, Jazaa Al-Shemmari had left for Syria eight days before being killed in a battle in Yabroud on 21 March. The Syrian government said it recaptured Yabroud, a strategic town close to the border with Lebanon, on 16 March; according to a report in the Financial Times, rebels had been weakened by a powerplay between Qatar and Saudi Arabia, each of whom was backing rival groups.

When Saudi Crown Prince Salman Bin Abdelaziz visited Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in February (GSN 964/9), their joint expression of support for the “formation of a transitional governing body” in Syria, and Sharif’s hailing of the two countries’ similar views on regional matters, prompted accusations of a strategic shift in Pakistan’s traditional policy of non-interference in the affairs of Muslim states. Discontent, among the Pakistani opposition and some commentators, was compounded by reports that Saudi Arabia wanted to buy Pakistani anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons for the Syrian opposition, that it was soliciting Pakistani help to train Syrian rebels, that it had asked Pakistan to dispatch two divisions (about 30,000 troops) to repress internal dissent in the kingdom, and that it wanted to recruit retired Pakistani soldiers and police for Bahrain.

The US and UAE have signed an agreement on co-operation in the fight against cross-border crime, and the exchange of information. According to state news agency Wam, interior minister Sheikh Saif Bin Zayed Al-Nahyan recently witnessed the signing of the agreement in Abu Dhabi by Abu Dhabi police’s director-general of police operations Major General Mohammed Bin Al-Awadhi Al-Menhali, on behalf of the interior ministry, and homeland security investigations deputy executive associate director Peter Edge, on behalf of the US.

US pressure for greater military cohesion – in return for help setting up a co-ordinated missile defence system – appears to be one of the drivers behind the GCC’s announcement of a combined military command. But Gulf rulers will want to avoid a multilateral force becoming a vehicle for Saudi Arabia’s regional ambitions. Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) announcements on defence co-operation are usually met with considerable scepticism. Not without good reason, for in more than 30 years of talk, there has been only limited progress towards a collective defence force capable of deterring external threats.