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The Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) summit ended on 11 December with a communiqué which welcomed the “new stand of the Iranian leadership towards the GCC states” and the preliminary agreement signed by the P5+1 and Iran (GSN 959/1), and “stressed the importance of closer co-operation between GCC countries and Iran”, according to UAE state news agency Wam. The communiqué follows 1-4 December visits to Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and the UAE by Iranian foreign minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, who said the trip was “to open a new page in relations with the Gulf”.

In a brazen show of force, militants attacked Yemen’s Ministry of Defence compound on 5 December. The attack and subsequent clashes killed 56 people, according to state news agency Saba. A preliminary report submitted to President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi indicated the assault was conducted by 12 men, most of whom were Saudi nationals, just before 9am. After storming the compound, the attackers detonated a car bomb near the hospital inside it. Clashes between militants and special forces continued until around 4:30am on 6 December. According to Saba, among the fatalities was the country director of German development agency GIZ and his assistant.

President Hassan Rouhani’s adept international diplomacy secured a quick win on the nuclear front, with the interim agreement signed by Tehran and the P5+1 on 24 November (GSN 959/1) paving the way for a scaling back of the crippling sanctions regime, and potentially an end to Iran’s years of isolation. But now he faces the arguably more onerous task of ensuring Iran’s opening to the West is not frustrated by domestic interests, headed by the powerful Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

The security vacuum in Yemen has continued to expand as political factions battle for control of the security forces. Insecurity is plaguing central provinces such as Dhamar, where, on 24 November, deputy governor Abdullah Mayseri was kidnapped, and Taizz, where Mohammed Moneer, a nephew of governor Shawqi Ahmed Hayel, remains in the hands of kidnappers. There have also been a number of violent attacks in Sanaa, including the killing of a Belarussian defence contractor by gunmen on a motorbike on 26 November.

The Foreign Affairs Committee (FAC) described defence co-operation as underpinning the entire UK-Saudi relationship. The UK is one of the three largest defence equipment suppliers to Saudi Arabia, alongside France and the US, supporting major defence sales directly through government-to-government contracts. “It is hard to obtain exact figures as to the volume of defence trade as the government restricts the supply of some information; however, the UK has granted export licences for almost £4bn ($6.5bn) worth of defence equipment over the last five years,” an FAC report on UK relations with Saudi Arabia and Bahrain released on 22 November said (see main story).

China is looking for fresh impetus in its relationship with the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) countries. Assisting it is Bahrain, whose King Hamad Bin Isa Al-Khalifa is seen by Beijing as a key player in efforts to rebuild diplomatic bridges with Saudi Arabia. Beijing is looking to the Bahraini GCC presidency to help broker agreement, at the group’s annual summit in December, on holding the first China-GCC Strategic Dialogue meeting in two years. The supposedly regular events were quietly shelved as Riyadh expressed its displeasure at China’s vetoing of UN resolutions on Syria and its attitude towards Iran, but Chinese sources told GSN Beijing was hoping to hold one in early 2014.

In the darkest hours of Sunday, 24 November, after four days of intense negotiations, the announcement finally came. “We have reached an agreement,” Iranian foreign minister Mohammad Javad Zarif posted on Twitter at 2:03am, and other foreign ministers, emerging from the conference room in a Geneva hotel where the deal was signed, confirmed. “Now the really hard part begins,” US secretary of state John Kerry told reporters. “We know this.” The interim agreement between Iran and the world powers of the P5+1 (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States, shepherded by European Union foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton) is intended to last six months, while the two sides seek a more permanent solution to the issue of Iran’s nuclear programme.

Fighting between Houthi and Salafi militias in Sadah province has left at least 100 people dead, Yemen remains in the mire. Almost two years since the 23 November 2011 signing of the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC)-brokered agreement that was to usher in democracy, any hope that the country’s crisis-ridden transition could serve as a model for other states in the region seems to have evaporated. At least 100 people have been killed in recent weeks in clashes between Salafists and Houthis in the north-western province of Sadah, tensions within the Southern Movement are rising, and new armed conflicts have flared in central provinces such as Ibb and Taiz.

One of the more bizarre arguments put forward by the Obama administration as it pushed for military intervention in Syria was that failing to respond to the horrific chemical attack on Ghouta would send the wrong ‘message’ to Iran. On 3 September, secretary of state John Kerry mentioned Iran four times in his brief opening statement to members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, as he sought to convince them of the need to strike. “Iran is hoping you look the other way,” Kerry said. “Our inaction would surely give them a permission slip for them to at least misinterpret our intention if not to put it to the test.” Defence secretary Chuck Hagel took a similar tone. “Our refusal to act would undermine the credibility of America’s other security commitments, including the president’s commitment to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon,” he said.

It has been a disappointing week for Saudi Arabia, as Arab and western allies pulled back from intervening in Syria. Despite a strong appeal from foreign minister Prince Saud Al-Faisal for the Arab League to back military intervention, Arab foreign ministers meeting in Cairo on 1 September failed to go beyond a call for the United Nations (UN) and international community to “assume their responsibilities” under the UN charter and international law. Riyadh – which has recognised the lack of Arab capacity to deal with Syria – has given the strongest statement of support for a western military strike: before the League meeting, Prince Saud told reporters the international community should use “all its powers” to stop aggression against Syrians.

On 2 August, the United States issued a global security alert, warning of “the continued potential for terrorist attacks, particularly in the Middle East and North Africa, and possibly occurring in or emanating from the Arabian Peninsula”. A string of embassy closures by the US and other governments followed two days later; some remained closed for a week. In Yemen, which seemed to be the epicentre of concerns, the embassy in Sanaa remained closed for routine consular services to the time of writing. US officials said the alarm was raised following intelligence that senior members of Yemen-based Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) had been discussing a major attack. Yemeni President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi expanded on that on 23 August in an address to police cadets which was broadcast on state television.

In the midst of a resurgent security crisis, the embattled government of Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki is grasping at an ambitious plan to expand the country’s special forces, apparently preferring a security-led approach to a full commitment to sectarian reconciliation. It is a plan which, under scrutiny, appears to be more difficult and less decisive than Baghdad hopes
By April 2010, when a US guided bomb killed Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) emir Abu Omar Al-Baghdadi and military commander Abu Ayyub Al-Masri, the US’ Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) had man-hunting in Iraq down to a fine art. GSN readers will remember the blow-by-blow coverage of Iraq’s security comeback in 2008-10, an important aspect of which was the defeat of AQI.

Austrian press reports suggest that Oman paid $50m to secure the release of three European hostages held in Yemen. The three – a Finnish couple, Leila and Atte Kaleva, and Austrian language student Dominik Neubauer, were kidnapped in Sanaa in December 2012.

On the surface, Saudi Arabia and Qatar have been unified in their approach to the Syrian crisis. But given the protracted nature of the war, and the rise of Muslim Brotherhood-linked groups within it, competition for control of a post-Assad Syria will only intensify. US secretary of state John Kerry’s 28 February pledge of $60m to the Syrian opposition was seen as a significant policy shift, but – frustratingly for Doha and Riyadh – stopped short of the weapons requested by those fighting to oust President Bashar Al-Assad. For the opposition, support in the form of non-lethal wares such as meals-ready-to-eat (MREs) is grossly inadequate, given its battlefield needs.

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has warned against attempts to destabilise Yemen and threatened the possibility of measures including sanctions, after Sanaa, vocally backed by the United States, sent a formal request asking the council to look into the case of a ship seized in Yemeni waters that it says was carrying weapons made in Iran.